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1CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
Globalization and the Rise of Multinational Corporations 
 
Even before the Dutch sailed to the East Indies or Marco Polo traveled to China, 
people have been interacting with other cultures in numerous ways, many of them for 
economic reasons. One would imagine it was quite difficult initially for these people to 
communicate and do business with each other, but even today obstacles in international 
business still exist. Although our world has certainly become much smaller in the last 
several centuries, cultural and geographical contexts still play a large part in shaping 
different societies and their methods of interaction with others.  
The term “globalization” is one heard of quite often in today’s world, particularly 
in economic terms, referring to the expansion of free market capitalism. There are many 
other aspects that fit into the globalization process, ranging from political to social to 
technological, that are a part of this increasing interconnectivity of people around the 
world. Thomas Friedman, journalist for The New York Times and a popular scholar of 
globalization, breaks it down simply into three main time periods. The first of these 
began with the exploration of the New World followed by the development of the nation-
state, as business between different parts of the world was organized and determined by 
the strength of entire countries. Friedman (2005) describes this period of time as 
“Globalization 1.0,” when the units of interaction were primarily these countries. More 
recently, following the industrial revolution and innovations in transportation and 
communication, the units of international interaction became multinational corporations 
who were finding materials, labor, as well as clients in countries outside their own. 
2Friedman calls this period “Globalization 2.0.” This has been the period most familiar to 
people today, although in just the last several years, we have entered “Globalization 3.0,” 
where interaction across nations can exist at the individual level and occur 
instantaneously (this will be addressed later).  
There are two types of theories on the effect that globalization has had on the 
world. The first is that of convergence, in which some degree of “universalization and 
homogeneity” results, as the differences that do exist are overshadowed by the 
similarities that are growing among countries (Lee, 2005, p. 15). This is countered by the 
idea of divergence, which represents a drive to retain the unique qualities of individual 
cultures in the face of a globalized world. It would seem that although many similarities 
exist throughout the world, thanks to new technology as well as the spread of American 
culture, it would be naïve or perhaps even arrogant to believe that the world’s population 
is becoming truly homogenous. McLuhan’s “global village” idea means we are all in 
contact with one another, essentially neighbors, but it has certainly not meant that we 
have become fundamentally alike. Instead, globalization has “promoted diversity in 
interests, demands and values” (Sparks-Fitzgerald & Spagnolia, 1999, p. 12). 
In the case of multinational companies doing business around the world, this 
certainly has implications for marketing to and communicating with consumers in 
different countries. Of course, the issue of culture has long been a factor. As 
communication scholar Alfred G. Smith proclaimed, “communication and culture are 
inseparable” (as quoted in Zaharna, 2000, p. 86), since the way we as human beings 
communicate is inherently tied to the culture in which we were raised. This has not been 
lost on those who are involved in international business, in which communicating to 
3business partners, clients and potential customers can be a complicated task. This seems 
to be especially true for American companies, who tend to assume that their business 
models, which are highly successful in the U.S., will be equally successful when 
transferred to another country. Cushman and King, however, suggest that “cultural 
settings not only determine much of behavior, but also require varying avenues for 
success within the diverse environments” (as cited in Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 475). 
Thus, due to cultural differences, one cannot take for granted that practices in one country 
will bring about the same results in another. 
 
Considerations from the Field of Intercultural Communication 
 
Although it has been noted that the field of intercultural communication has 
focused more on “describing and defining specific instances” than actually generating 
any type of theory (Casmir & Asuncion-Lande, as quoted in Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 
474), its study can help to better understand the cultural contexts of business. Some brief 
basics will be introduced here. To begin with, Zaharna (2001) describes two sets of 
differences to be considered in reaching global publics: national and cultural. National 
differences include: the political structure, particularly the hierarchy of decision-making 
and power; the economic structure, with such issues as the existence of a free market 
system; the state of the mass media, in particular the level of technological development, 
but also in terms of ownership and reach; the infrastructure, both in transportation and 
communication, taking technological development into account; the legal structure, 
which determines what kind of behavior is allowed; and finally the social structure, 
which takes demographics into account.  
4Zaharna (2001) notes that understanding national differences offers an indication 
of what is “feasible” when operating in another country, but only by understanding 
cultural differences can a corporation have an idea of what might be “effective” in that 
country (p. 139). Scholars of intercultural communication have looked deeply into this 
issue of cultural differences and discovered several prominent distinctions. First of all, 
Edward T. Hall made the division into high-context and low-context cultures, depending 
on how much of the meaning of the communication message is placed in the external 
context of the message rather than explicitly in the message itself (Zaharna, 2001). There 
are also several distinctions that involve the concept of time. One of these, noted by Hall, 
is the split between monochronic cultures, who plan for events to happen one at a time, 
and polychronic cultures, who seem to be involved in a number of activities at the same 
time. Florence Kluckhohn studied the split between activity-oriented cultures, who focus 
on working toward measurable achievements, and being-oriented cultures, who place 
more importance on a person’s origins and status than what he or she actually does. 
Kluckhohn also made a division between future-oriented cultures, who believe in the 
importance of constant innovation, and past-oriented cultures, for whom tradition and 
historical contexts are of great significance (Zaharna, 2001). A further consideration of 
time was made by Dorothy Lee, who noted differences in linear cultures, who believe in 
an organized start and end for events, and non-linear cultures, where organization can 
seem to be random or even cyclical (Zaharna, 2001).  
 Another intercultural scholar, Geert Hofstede, devised five dimensions that 
further divide cultures. One of these is power distance, which focuses on the acceptance 
of inequality of power and authority as part of a culture; the greater the distance, the more 
5natural the social hierarchy seems. Many Asian countries have a high power distance, 
while clearly for Western countries like the U.S. it is quite low. Another dimension is that 
of an individualist versus a collectivistic attitude, where identity and value are based 
either within one person or within a larger social system, where the concept of “face” is 
of high importance (de Mooij, 1998, p. 75). Cultures are further divided by the dimension 
of masculinity versus femininity, between those societies that value success and 
accomplishments and those that value the well being of others above all. Another 
dimension is that of uncertainty avoidance, which is determined by how much a society is 
made uneasy by a lack of predictability or clarity and how important strict rules and 
structure are. Finally, the fifth dimension is that of long-term versus short-term 
orientation, with long-term oriented cultures looking toward the future with a more 
pragmatic and prudent attitude (de Mooij, 1998). 
 Clearly, there are many differences to consider, and there is no set list to consult 
for comparing any given culture. It is obvious, however, that some of these different 
values can make typical business models difficult to employ in other countries. Some 
companies have pushed for “the placement of resources and decision-making authority in 
local markets, where local communicators best understand the needs of their audiences” 
(Stohl, as cited in Lee, 2005, p. 15), while others may use local consultants. No matter 
how strong a corporation is, however, if it does not understand the basics of intercultural 
communication or chooses to ignore them, it can find itself in serious trouble when things 
go awry and it needs to inform and reassure its various publics, which in today’s world 
often span a number of different cultures and even continents.  
 
6Product Recalls 
 
This thesis will examine two case studies of corporations that experienced a crisis 
on the international stage where a main problem was dealing with international publics. 
The first of these will focus on a crisis that appears in the form of a product recall. 
Product recalls are cause for anxiety for any business, due to their frequent occurrence, 
their potential for devastating ramifications, and their requirement of comprehensive 
involvement from public relations professionals (Gibson, 1995). Recalls can involve 
enormous costs for a company, and obviously preventing the need for one is the optimal 
strategy, but it is rarely a completely realistic one. Recalls thus provide a very important 
role for crisis communication officials, as there is a need to quickly inform the public but 
also to make sure that the company’s image does not suffer for it. As German risk 
consultant Robin S. Socha explains, “a company has to draw a line…it has to take care of 
its business and protect its clients at the same time” (Andrews, 1999, p. 4). The best 
strategy is to have a recall plan already in place, so that when the event happens it can run 
as smoothly as possible. Smith, Thomas and Quelch (1996) suggest that such a plan 
should actually be a “reverse-marketing plan” where “customer satisfaction and other 
marketing goals remain paramount” (p. 105). The only difference is that instead of 
providing the consumer or retailer with a product, the company is taking it away. 
Sometimes such crises can be managed so well that they actually result in 
unforeseen benefits for a company; for example, Saturn and Inuit both “reacted 
strategically” to their own product recalls, “focusing on long-term marketing 
implications,” and were able to maintain and even strengthen relationships with their 
customers (Smith et al., 1996, p. 104). However this is more often the case with small-
7scale recalls; any recall that involves serious harm or death to consumers can assure a 
more difficult and unpredictable road ahead for an organization. In cases where the 
possibility for public harm is high, it is imperative to make a decision of whether to enact 
a recall as soon as possible. However, making a recall too soon might “give credibility to 
an unsubstantiated charge” (Smith et al., 1996, p. 106). Pepsi successfully avoided doing 
this during its syringe hoax, but Audi, on the other hand, recalled over 100,000 cars to fix 
a problem that turned out to be caused by driver error, not mechanical error, and the 
company suffered a two-thirds reduction in sales, increased levels of model depreciation, 
as well as a slew of negative publicity (Smith et al., 1996). There is also the problem that 
a recall will imply liability and result in an influx of lawsuits against the company, while 
product regulators may step in as well to add to a company’s woes. Meanwhile, 
competitors may take advantage of the situation to try and gain market share, and it will 
be difficult to reintroduce the recalled product to the market as a result (Smith et al., 
1996). Even more so, the difficulty will arise from the damage done to the brand’s image 
by the way a recall can “shatter consumer confidence” as well as “disrupt channel and 
supplier relationships” (Smith et al., 1996, p. 112). At the same time, however, failure or 
serious delay of a needed recall could exacerbate all of these factors to an even greater 
extent. 
The problems faced by a corporation during a product recall can certainly 
multiply when the recall occurs outside of that company’s home country, a situation that 
has now become quite possible in today’s age of multinationals and global markets. 
Aside from the aforementioned national and cultural differences, American companies 
also face the added hurdle of being seen as cultural imperialists, which can stir up 
8nationalist sentiment. If not properly understood, these differences can have disastrous 
consequences for a corporation.  
Larry Foster, former head of PR for Johnson & Johnson, notes that “the 
international realm is by far ‘the most difficult to manage…it is more complex, more 
unpredictable, and generates more risk than most domestic-based public relations 
programs” (as quoted in Wakefield, 2000, p. 63). While for many firms public relations is 
only an arm of the marketing division, Wakefield stresses the need to develop an 
“outside-in” focus that views the organization “from the perspective of the various 
publics, then respond[s] to those views in an appropriate manner” (2000, p. 63). This 
requires that the public relations division be uncoupled from marketing and instead linked 
to management, with open interaction between all its parts. Because as this first case 
study will show, those companies whose public relations divisions do not adequately 
address global considerations can face a much steeper road ahead when a crisis hits.  
Marketing Mistakes 
 
The second case study will examine a crisis resulting from a flawed marketing 
plan. New marketing plans are being created everyday for the multitude of companies in 
the world who need consumers to purchase their products and services. Much research, of 
course, must go into these plans so that these companies can reach and inform the proper 
segments of the market. This research is not limited simply to consumers and their 
behavior but should extend to a host of external factors including the political climate, the 
shape of the economy, and social trends. When companies decide to launch international 
marketing efforts, this research becomes even more important due to the many national 
9and cultural differences that exist. Packman and Casmir (1999) stress the need for a 
“cautious, and sometimes time-consuming process that should begin prior to entering 
another culture,” recommending a “‘steady as she goes’ approach” (p. 486). 
Of course, mistakes can never be one hundred percent unavoidable, due to 
changing conditions in the world, but often they can be attributed to errors in judgment as 
well. In hindsight, many mistakes seem as if they should have been obvious, and in the 
realm of international marketing there are several notable cases of this. Chevrolet 
introduced the Nova model to Mexico, where that name means “does not go;” similarly, 
Ford brought the Feira truck into the Latin American market, where the name translates 
to “ugly old woman” (Herbig, 1998, p. 3, 37). Betty Crocker tried to enter the British 
cake mix market with American-style fancy cakes mixes and frosting, but the British like 
dryer, spongier cake that goes with tea (Herbig, 1998).  
In international marketing, errors can also occur because of ethnocentrism, where 
a company assumes that its ways of doing things are superior to those of other cultures. 
One such example is Federal Express’ expansion to Europe, where all its materials were 
printed in English and it kept its schedules tailored to the American workday, despite the 
variation in hours worked by Europeans (Herbig, 1998). Many companies have learned to 
avoid this behavior, instead customizing their offerings for different countries. Tyson 
Foods has adapted thousands of products to meet the local demand of over fifty countries; 
Levi’s jeans leaves the marketing decisions to local managers in each country, so that its 
ads differ from place to place and can connect more directly with local consumers 
(Herbig, 1998). 
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In the field of marketing, Hartley (2001) identifies two types of mistakes that 
professionals make. The first are mistakes of omission, where a conservative 
management holds on to the status quo while the market environment changes around it. 
The second type are mistakes of commission, which include poor decision-making and 
usually have visible costs associated with them. The one benefit of mistakes is that they 
can act as learning experiences, so that the same mistake will not be made again in the 
future. Of course, a company must still look out for potential new mistakes and be able to 
take swift corrective action after discovering the root cause of any new problem (Hartley, 
2001). Complacency with present success can create a false sense of security, leading to 
mistakes of omission, and can even foster an attitude of arrogance or superiority that can 
make mistakes of commission harder to foresee. This is indeed a precarious situation, for 
as this second study will observe, when a corporation combines mistakes of both 
omission and commission, the effect on its business can be devastating, and recovery 
becomes quite difficult. 
Looking Ahead 
 
This paper will conclude by suggesting some trends that exist now and will persist 
in the future in the field of international business communication, using the company 
Google as an example. There is no doubt that everything done in the world today can be 
viewed in a larger global context, and this is particularly true for business activities. 
Harris Diamond, CEO of the international public relations firm Weber Shandwick, 
suggests that “companies need to make their brands relevant in ways that are faithful to 
the core attributes of the brand, yet flexible enough to accommodate diverse trading 
11
patterns, differing consumer tastes and behavior, and a variety of businesses, media and 
political cultures” (2007, paragraph 17). As this paper will demonstrate, a thorough 
understanding of this global context and a willingness to embrace change are essential for 
the continued success of any organization operating in today’s world. 
Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. 
 Chapter One has introduced the topic and some of the key ideas behind it, as well 
as some background information for the two case studies examined in the thesis. 
 Chapter Two will examine a product recall that Coca-Cola struggled with in 
Belgium, which exhibited an uncharacteristic deviation from the company’s well-known 
brand marketing brilliance.
Chapter Three will take a look at the problems that Disney encountered as it tried 
to establish its first theme park in Europe and found itself facing a culture as proud and 
protective as Disney itself. 
 Chapter Four will explain some trends in international business communication 
and suggest what to watch out for in the future, with an analysis of Google in particular.  
 Finally, Chapter Five, the conclusion, will discuss lessons learned from the case 
studies and strategies to be used for the future, as well as some final thoughts on 
globalization’s effect on culture and corporations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Things Go Worse for Coke: 
The Coca-Cola Contamination Crisis in Belgium
The Case of Coca-Cola 
 
Coca-Cola faced an international public relations crisis in Europe in 1999. 
Schoolchildren in various towns in Belgium were turning up sick after drinking Coke 
products, and the problem was eventually linked to quality control lapses at two bottling 
plants in Belgium and France. This resulted in a recall of seventeen million cases of Coke 
products in several European countries, costing Coca-Cola approximately $250 million. 
Meanwhile, the company was criticized for its slow, vague, and unsatisfying explanations 
of the problem.  
The cross-cultural nature of the crisis certainly intensified the situation. Coca-
Cola’s relations with Europe were strained due to antitrust accusations against the 
corporation after it had attempted to expand its European operations by merging with 
several bottling companies in the region, including Cadbury Schweppes and Orangina. 
Hartley (2001) suggests that these brazen moves not only frustrated European officials 
but “perhaps motivated them to make life difficult for Coke” (p. 17). Coca-Cola’s CEO, 
Douglas Ivester, who has been described by a coworker as a “‘terribly rational’ manager” 
(Smith, Feighan & O’Rourke, 2002, p. 297), did not help matters with his aggressive 
personality and accountant’s view of the world. 
The larger contextual background of the crisis also included other contamination 
scares that had occurred in Europe. Earlier that year, dioxin, a carcinogen, had been 
found in meat products in Europe and Belgium in particular, and prior to that there was 
13
the threat of mad cow disease. This was still fresh in the European public’s minds, and so 
they were much more sensitive to the contamination crisis of Coca-Cola when it 
occurred. Similarly, the Belgian government was particularly shaken up by the earlier 
scares, which were a huge source of embarrassment. Both the prime minister and health 
minister had been forced to resign, so officials had become extremely wary of such health 
threats. Because of the criticism that had been heaped on them earlier, officials “were 
inclined to be overzealous in their dealings with this big U.S. firm” (Hartley, 2001, p. 
18).  
These issues presented a serious problem for Coca-Cola, which derived twenty-
six percent of its $18 billion in revenues from the European market, where it enjoyed a 
forty-nine percent market share (Smith et al., 2002, p. 296). Unfortunately, it was not 
well equipped to handle such an international product recall crisis, and it would soon see 
those figures drop. 
 
The Early Stages -- Overlooking Problems 
 
In the months before the crisis hit, there were several warning signs that Coca-
Cola either failed to notice or ignored, which could have prevented a crisis if they had 
been dealt with sooner. First of all, the bottling plant that Coca-Cola used in Antwerp had 
failed to procure certificates of analysis verifying the purity of carbon dioxide from its 
supplier, which was part of Coca-Cola’s procedure. Furthermore, workers from the 
Antwerp plant had neglected to conduct routine tests of the carbon dioxide after it was 
pumped into storage tanks, something that was also required by Coca-Cola (Deogun, 
Hagerty, Stecklow & Johannes, 1999). Whether management of these factories, run by 
14
Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. (CCE), knew about these issues or not, they clearly violated 
Coca-Cola’s expected protocol.  
One of the biggest signs of trouble that stared the company directly in the face, 
however, was the report of illness by four men at a bar near Antwerp, which occurred on 
May 15, less than a month before the crisis hit. These men claimed the symptoms 
occurred after drinking funny-smelling Cokes, but doctors did not find anything, nor did 
a government laboratory that took samples from the same batch of Coke. A Coca-Cola 
spokesman was reported as saying the company had “found no reason to be concerned,” 
and that the situation was “thought to be an anomaly” (Cowell, 1999, p. C1). As such, no 
further attention was paid to it by either Coca-Cola or Belgian officials. 
 
The Crisis Hits -- Sick Children, Skeptical Officials, Recall 
 
Because Coca-Cola did nothing to react to those warning signs, they escalated 
into a severe crisis in June of 1999 as over a hundred schoolchildren in different cities 
began to report symptoms after drinking odd-smelling Coca-Cola products. The first city 
affected was Bornem, in northern Belgium, where forty-one children fell ill on June 8. 
Coca-Cola determined the problem stemmed from Coke bottles produced at their 
Antwerp plant and recalled 100,000 cases—2.5 million bottles—in the next twenty-four 
hours. Meanwhile it sent a team of scientists to the plant, but nothing was found in any 
tests of samples. A Coca-Cola spokeswoman in Brussels assured that it was “a quality 
issue, not a health issue” (Brannigan & Richter, 1999, p. A4). Further comments by 
Belgian Coca-Cola spokespeople would continue this strategy of denial of health risks, 
even while children continued to become ill.  
15
On the same day as Bornem, reports came in from nearby Besele of bad-smelling 
Cokes from a vending machine, though there were no cases of illness. On June 10, 
however, eight people in Bruges reported becoming sick after drinking Coke. In both of 
these cases the product was linked to a production plant in Dunkirk, France, close to the 
border. On June 11, a senior executive from Coca-Cola Enterprises was sent to appease 
the new health minister Luc Van den Bossche, but during the middle of the meeting there 
was a phone call reporting that fifteen more people had become ill in Harelbeke after 
drinking Fanta, a Coke product produced at a plant in Ghent. On June 14, thirty-eight 
children were rushed to the hospital just hours after a school official had received word 
from Coca-Cola, via a hotline, that the school’s vending machines should be safe as long 
as they did not contain certain codes on their products. It turned out that Coca-Cola had 
accidentally given the school an incomplete list of codes. The next day, eight more 
children became sick in Kortrijk (Deogun et al., 1999). 
On June 14, the Belgian government banned the sale of all Coca-Cola products. It 
had already answered more than 200 calls after setting up a call center for Belgian 
consumers on June 11. A health ministry spokesman criticized Coca-Cola for not 
speaking out and for “failing to state ‘clearly what was behind the intoxication,’” while 
Coca-Cola declared itself “mystified” by the government’s decision to extend the ban 
(“Coca-Cola pulled,” 1999). Whether it thought the ban was justified or not, Coca-Cola 
faced the fact that  “unlike a voluntary recall…a ban may suggest that regulators believe 
a company is not taking sufficient steps to protect the public” (Abelson, 1999, p. 2). This 
view that Coca-Cola was not doing enough to respond to the crisis would continue to 
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pose problems for the company, because true or not, it followed Benoit’s (1997) assertion 
that in a crisis, perception is stronger than reality. 
Geographical Spread of the Crisis
Coca-Cola went on to voluntary recall all of its products in the Netherlands that 
had been produced in Belgium as a precaution, while health officials in Luxembourg took 
action themselves to remove Coca-Cola products in its stores and insist that people not 
drink them. In Hesse, Germany, officials called for tests on Coke products, even though it 
was not clear if any of them had been imported from Belgium. However officials from 
the UK did not take action, thanks to a phone call from Coca-Cola to assure them that 
none of their batches were those involved (“Coca-Cola pulled,” 1999). French consumer 
affairs minister Marylise Lebranchu, on the other hand, called for a withdrawal of fifty 
million cans of Coke, due to “Coca-Cola’s inability to provide a clear explanation on the 
traceability of its products” in a prompt manner and skepticism of the company’s 
description of the cause of the problem (“Fifty million cans,” 1999).  
Phillip Lenfant, the general manager of Coca-Cola Belgium, tried to assure that it 
was “a purely Belgian problem” (“Coca-Cola health scare still,” 1999). The French 
government, however, later reported eighty cases of complaints of similar symptoms 
from people in northern France near the Belgian border (Hagerty & Deogun, 1999). 
Local groups were also taking action themselves; officials in Trier, Germany, confiscated 
cans with French labels, while cans with English labels were taken in northwest Spain 
(Andrews, 1999; “Belgian scientists question,” 1999). Spain also ordered 390,000 bottles 
off its shelves even though no problems had been reported and Coca-Cola Espana assured 
its products were safe. In Switzerland Coca-Cola took a decidedly proactive approach, 
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exchanging imported cans with customers at no charge (“Coca-Cola health scare 
widens,” 1999).  
The scare spread even further than Europe, as even Saudi Arabia banned imports 
of any Coke products made in Belgium (Hagerty & Deogun, 1999). The health minister 
of the Central African Republic also cautioned its people against drinking Coke products 
(Hagerty & Barrett, 1999a), while officials in Cote d’Ivoire withdrew 50,000 cans from 
its market (“Coca-Cola gives,” 1999), and Kenya pulled Coca-Cola products from 
Europe off of its shelves as well (Kielmas, 1999). Coca-Cola’s ambiguous denial and 
failure to quickly point to the source of the problem had led to widespread disruption of 
its business. 
Coca-Cola’s Action
After the reports of illnesses began, Coca-Cola sent officials from all of its global 
offices to Brussels to set up a main center of operations. Chief among these was Dr. 
Anton Amon, senior vice president for product integrity, who brought six technical 
specialists with him (Hagerty & Deogun, 1999a). After assuring that it had been 
“working…around the clock” (Deogun & Richter, 1999a, p. B15), on June 15 Coca-Cola 
finally released the cause of the problem, which was twofold. There was impure carbon 
dioxide used at the Antwerp plant, later found to be caused by a sulfur compound, and 
contamination from the fungicide used on wooden pallets at the Dunkirk plant in France. 
The company claimed these were “identified with absolute certainty” (“Coca-Cola 
Belgium identifies,” 1999). In addition, as mentioned earlier, these lapses were the result 
of a failure to comply with Coca-Cola policy, which helped the company in its strategy of 
shifting some of the blame for the problem onto its bottling plants, although these were 
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owned by Coca-Cola. However, these explanations were still met with skepticism by 
many, authorities and consumers alike.  
On June 16, Randal Donaldson, Coca-Cola’s chief spokesman, arrived in Brussels 
to lead the effort, declaring the company’s desire to “provide as much health and test data 
as possible to governments” (Hagerty & Deogun, 1999a, p. B1). Coca-Cola’s chairman 
and CEO Douglas Ivester finally released a statement on June 16, over a week after the 
first case of sick schoolchildren had been reported. He expressed “[deep] regret” for any 
problems caused and stressed that the company was “taking all the necessary steps to 
ensure that all [their] products meet the highest quality standards,” adding that “nothing 
less is acceptable…we will not rest until…this job is complete” (“Coca-Cola chairman,” 
1999). Ivester also appealed to consumers, noting, “our success has been based on the 
trust that consumers have in [our] quality” (“Coca-Cola chairman,” 1999). As part of a 
strategy of appeasement, Coca-Cola also offered to compensate any customers for 
medical expenses, contingent upon a medical certificate verifying that a link between the 
illness and the product was established (“Coke will foot,” 1999). However the fact that 
Ivester had waited so long to speak did not sit well with the public, many of whom were 
still anxious from previous health crises, and may have reduced the effectiveness of his 
message. 
Just when Coca-Cola thought the Belgian government would decide to lift its ban 
after much appealing, on June 16 the government announced it would postpone its 
decision until it had met with health officials from the rest of the European Union 
(Hagerty & Deogun, 1999a). The next day, however, both Belgium and France relaxed 
the ban to include only Coca-Cola, Fanta, and Sprite drinks, not any other Coke products. 
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Belgian health minister Van den Bossche still maintained that Coke’s explanation was 
inadequate, that it could not “explain in a reassuring and satisfactory manner the 
appearance of these illness symptoms” (“Certain Coca-Cola,” 1999).  
Ivester did not actually show up in Brussels until June 18, ten days after the first 
reported illnesses, to work with the crisis management team. As another example of 
Coca-Cola’s strategy to shift the blame onto other parties, Ivester cited the Belgian 
government as the reason Coca-Cola did not initially reveal much information; he 
maintained that health minister Van den Bossche did not want the issue “processed in the 
press” and that Coca-Cola “chose to follow his guidance” (Tomkins, 1999b, p. 3). 
Naturally, of course, the issue was the source of much interest and speculation by the 
media, most notably over why Coca-Cola was not giving out any specific information to 
the concerned public. 
Earlier in the week the health ministry had reported that some blood tests done in 
a toxicology lab in Brussels had identified a few cases of hemolysis, a problem that leads 
to the destruction of red blood cells, in some of the hospitalized children (Deogun & 
Richter, 1999a). However the alarm caused by this announcement subsided somewhat 
after a lab spokesman later reported that there was only one known case and that there 
was no identifiable link to Coca-Cola (Deogun & Richter, 1999b). After enlisting the 
services of a toxicology professor from Utrecht University, Coca-Cola released a report 
on June 21 that stated that the contaminating substances were not present in large enough 
amounts to cause illness, though France still upheld its ban and its closure of the Dunkirk 
plant. European Commission inspectors also decided to undertake joint investigations at 
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the two plants with Belgian and French officials, believing the issues to still not be 
satisfactorily explained. 
Some other Belgian scientists suggested that the whole situation could be “a form 
of psychosis” caused by the recent health scares with meat products, and a professor of 
social psychology hypothesized the existence of “a mass psychogenic malaise” (“Belgian 
scientists question,” 1999). After finding no link between the illnesses and Coke, even the 
French health minister suggested that they could be psychosomatic (“New twist,” 1999). 
Coca-Cola made use of this explanation, suggesting the symptoms were either short-term 
or psychological. 
On June 22, Ivester finally made a formal personal apology to Belgian consumers 
for any problems, through newspaper advertisements, and he promised to get to the 
bottom of the issue, though he did not admit that any Coke products had made anyone 
sick. He also apologized in particular for the delay of Coca-Cola’s response, saying, “I 
should have spoken with you earlier” and offered a toll free number to call for any 
questions (Hagerty & Deogun, 1999b, p. A3). In Spain, Greece, Italy, and France, Coca-
Cola also bought full-page ads in newspapers. The French ad, signed by the president of 
Coca-Cola France, assured consumers that its products were “irreproachable” and also 
released a toll-free number to call (“Coca-Cola reassures,” 1999). In addition, Ivester sent 
a companywide memo explaining the context of the crisis and noting that Europe was 
“understandably sensitive and cautious” (Hays, 1999a, p. 4). Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., 
the bottling company, issued its own apology two days later. 
This apology might have been more successful if it had not been so belated. On 
June 23, though, production was finally allowed to resume at Belgian plants after Coca-
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Cola had complied with Van den Bossche’s requirements to obtain new raw materials, 
clean the plants, improve safety measures, devise a better production-monitoring system, 
and properly dispense with any remaining product (Hagerty & Barrett, 1999b). The same 
day, however, Dunkirk authorities called for a judicial inquiry into the drinks bottled in 
its local plant, specifically for rat poison, though the consumer affairs minister reported 
no knowledge of it (“New twist,” 1999). Production was still allowed to resume at the 
Dunkirk plant on June 25, after the French food safety council AFSSA was unable to cite 
any health risks. Coca-Cola vending machines throughout Belgium remained closed 
down, however, until they could all be examined. 
Financial Implications
The crisis had also affected Coca-Cola’s financial stability, as shares dropped 1.6 
percent on June 15 (“Coca-Cola health scare still,” 1999). Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., 
however, the bottling company that owns the plants, saw a ten percent drop in stock 
prices a week after the scare began (Hagerty & Barrett, 1999a). Analysts were estimating 
that as a result of bans CCE was losing $3.4 million in revenue per day (Hays, 1999a), 
which was unfortunate as the summer was when the company usually saw its highest 
sales. CCE also expected a $60 million cost for the recall for the second quarter, though 
some of it would be covered by insurance. Analysts predicted a further $35 million 
reduction of operating profit due to lost sales and expenses to be used for new marketing 
plans (Hagerty & Deogun, 1999c). 
Meanwhile, Coca-Cola’s competitors were benefiting from the recall; Virgin Cola 
reported its highest ever demand in Belgium, though Pepsi officially said it would not try 
to take advantage of Coca-Cola’s misfortunes (Slater & Wentz, 1999). Worldwide 
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markets, however, were reporting decreased sales of Coke as well as more demand for 
Pepsi.  
 
An Uphill Battle -- Winning Back Europe 
After Coca-Cola had figured out the problem, explained it to the public, and was 
able to resume production in Belgium, it found itself facing the huge task of trying to 
restore its image with Belgian consumers as well as with Europe in general. In addition to 
hiring the Publicis Groupe to take charge of crisis communication, Ivester had called 
former Johnson & Johnson CEO James Burke, who had handled the Tylenol product 
recall crisis, to discuss how to formulate an effective strategy in order to accomplish this 
task. By the end of June Ivester had declared that the worst was over, and the focus was 
now on rebuilding the business and relationships with consumers (“Coca-Cola sees 
sales,” 1999). 
Marketing Strategy
Coca-Cola first of all promised to improve its quality control measures to ensure 
that any such contamination could not happen in the future. It specifically swore to 
always make sure that carbon dioxide is received with a certificate of analysis and that 
each plant must also test it. Furthermore, it would no longer use fungicide on its wooden 
pallets. 
The next strategy it employed was to compensate consumers, as Ivester himself 
promised to buy everyone in Belgium a Coke. The company sent 5,000 representatives to 
put coupons in the mailboxes of every home. Ivester had previously vowed to “spend 
whatever is required” to win back consumers (Echikson & Rocks, 1999, p. 32). Coca-
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Cola’s new marketing campaign for Europe to help regain its share of the market was 
entitled “Coke’s Back,” and it stressed this message in all its efforts. It sent hundreds of 
representatives to talk to consumers in retail stores, while some of its other promotions 
included a beach party, a “Coca-Cola summer tour,” concerts, and free premiums given 
to more than 72,000 consumers (Johnson & Peppas, 2003).   
After the campaign had begun, a survey of consumers in Belgium, France and 
Germany revealed that nineteen percent of those polled showed “at least some 
reservation” about continuing to buy Coca-Cola. But seventy-seven percent of Belgians, 
seventy percent of French and sixty-one percent of Germans reported that they after 
viewing the new ads they had “complete faith” in Coke (“Coke faces struggle,” 1999).  
More Obstacles Surface
Coca-Cola also experienced a few more problems with contaminated products in 
the following weeks. A small recall was undergone in Portugal due to charcoal residue 
found in some cans from filtration systems, though there was no health risk. A bigger 
scare occurred in Poland, however, where mold and bacteria were found in its Bonaqua 
mineral water due to an incomplete bottle cleaning process. Fortunately the mold and 
bacteria did not pose a health threat, but Coca-Cola still had to recall 1,500 bottles, which 
was later expanded to 180,000. In both instances Coca-Cola responded much quicker 
than it did in Belgium, as it had obviously learned from that mistake. 
 Coca-Cola also reported a loss of second-quarter profit of twenty-one percent, 
while European sales volume fell seven percent and worldwide sales dropped two 
percent, which were all worse than predicted (Hays, 1999b). Meanwhile, Coca-Cola 
Enterprises adjusted its estimate of the cost of the product recalls to $103 million. 
24
In October, just when things seemed to be nearly back to normal, Coca-Cola 
received a huge shock when it found that more Belgian schoolchildren had gotten sick, 
this time in Tienen. However there was no bad smell involved with the product, and 
samples tested in a lab turned out normal. Coca-Cola was thus freed of responsibility, but 
it brought back an unfortunate reminder to the public. The real causes of the original 
illnesses had never been unequivocally determined, and the European Commission had 
also joined the ranks of those unsatisfied with Coca-Cola’s explanations following its 
investigation. 
The attitude of European officials to Coca-Cola had clearly not improved, as E.U. 
officials raided several of its offices in four countries due to antitrust suspicions of illegal 
use of rebates. Later on in November a Belgian court ordered Coca-Cola to terminate its 
promotional campaign at the behest of a competitor, Chaudfontaine, who was concerned 
that the company was abusing its market position by giving out free cases of drinks and 
discount vouchers. Coca-Cola was told to stop within three days and to tell all its 
wholesalers and 60,000 retail outlets or else face a hefty fine. The promotion had been 
effective, however, as Coca-Cola had recovered its market share in Belgium, which was 
back up to fifty-six percent (“Coca-Cola ordered,” 1999). 
Early the next year, Isy Pelc, head of psychiatry and psychological medicine at 
Brugmann Hospital in Belgium and member of the governmental health advisory board, 
carried out psychological tests on 150 children, 110 of whom had become ill after 
drinking Coke. His findings agreed with earlier ones that the children had real, not 
imaginary symptoms, but that these were “psychosomatic illnesses…triggered by 
unpleasant odors,” due to the recent concerns about dioxin and mad cow contamination 
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(Unger, 2000, p. 1F). A Coca-Cola spokesman stated that these findings brought “clarity 
and closure” to the previous summer’s incident, which the company recognized as “a 
humbling experience—a wake-up call” (Unger, 2000, p. 1F). 
Management Changes
Coca-Cola also underwent a reorganization of its management. After a period of 
“extensive reflection, chairman and CEO Douglas Ivester decided to retire, citing the 
need for “change” and “fresh leadership” (McKay & Deogun, 1999, p. B1). The company 
selected Douglas Daft, who was in charge of the Asian business, to succeed him. Daft 
was seen as close to the opposite of Ivester, instead noted for his “gravitas” and “broader 
strategic view of the business” (McKay & Deogun, 1999, p. B1). Part of Daft’s new 
strategy involved heavy restructuring of the company, such as a layoff of 6,000 workers 
including half of those at the Atlanta headquarters, which would be decentralized, putting 
the decision-making process at the local level as part of a new goal to “ensure that Coca-
Cola complements the local culture in every community where it is sold” (Taylor, 2000, 
p. 290). 
Crisis Resolution -- Thinking and Acting Locally 
 
Finally, Coca-Cola’s crisis reached a resolution, as the company regained its pre-
crisis health, specifically in terms of market share. Although the ban itself had only been 
in three countries, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, whose sales only accounted for 
four percent of Coca-Cola’s global revenue, the stigma of a contamination crisis was 
much more of a threat to its business, both with appealing to consumers and expanding its 
distribution in Europe. 
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One of the major lessons for Coca-Cola was to appeal to markets locally. New 
CEO Douglas Daft’s mantra was “think local, act local.” Daft was particularly dedicated 
to improving the company’s relationships with European groups, becoming “more 
responsive to European regulators and cultural sensitivities than it had been” (Freedman 
& Butterfield, 2000, p. 13).  
With several lessons now learned, Coca-Cola was also able to spot and rectify 
future problems before they evolved into crises. Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., its bottling 
company, voluntarily recalled more than 25,000 cases of two-liter bottles in Georgia and 
Florida in October of 2001. The company claimed that the products did not “meet its 
bottling standards” but that they “never posed any health concerns” (“Recall of some of 
Coke,” 2001, p. B2). The recall was actually not revealed until months after it had 
happened; the FDA stated that if the recall had “posed immediate danger to consumers 
the agency would have issued a public alert at the time” (“Recall of some of Coke,” 2001, 
p. B2). Another voluntary recall took place in France in March of 2001 due to a 
packaging defect that could cause glass bottles to break. CCE worked with the French 
government to inform the public and collect all of the bottles, and it also ran ads in 
French newspapers, calling the recall “a precaution” (“Bottles recalled in France,” 2001, 
p. C9). In May of the same year, a third recall took place, this time back in Belgium, due 
to exposure of fruit-flavored soft drinks to light, which affected their taste and color. 
Although Coca-Cola claimed that there was “no health risk,” it was recalling the bottles 
because it could not “guarantee the quality” (“Coca-Cola recalls bottles,“ 2001, p. B11). 
Still, there was some trouble on the horizon, involving multiple allegations of 
pesticide contamination in India, which were also applied to rival Pepsi. However, tests 
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showed that the levels were within the legal limits for the country for both companies. 
Coca-Cola also faced a recall of its Dasani bottled water in the U.K. in 2004 after finding 
bromate levels that were above legal limits. Though the recall process was simple enough 
and Coca-Cola was quick to explain the problem, it faced more difficulties due to already 
existing hostility against the product because it was purified tap water, not spring water, 
and eventually the company indefinitely postponed the product’s launch across Europe. 
 
Conclusion -- Lessons Learned from Coke  
 
What many have wondered at is the fact that a company like Coca-Cola, which is 
renowned for its marketing prowess and corporate culture, could falter so badly in such a 
situation as the Belgian contamination crisis. Smith et al. (2000) note that it was the 
government, not Coca-Cola, who took the initiative to safeguard the public from the 
health threat. Belgian health minister Luc Van den Bossche remarked, “It’s a bit 
disturbing that a big firm with worldwide fame…did not take far-reaching measures more 
promptly” (Buckley & Liu, 1999, p. 1). 
Coca-Cola also suffered more from its recall due to its strong global recognition, 
which resulted in extensive publicity around the world as it stumbled along. Some of the 
strategies it chose to salvage its image were not successful and seemed to have ended up 
intensifying the initial stage of its crisis. Its strategy of denial and shifting blame brought 
about confusion, as it did not have its story straight as the crisis unfolded. It made the 
mistake of sending mixed messages, as it “acknowledged that the reported illness was the 
real thing, admitted that it was responsible for defective products, but adamantly denied 
culpability for the illness” (Whelan, 1999, p. A26). Lenfant, the Coca-Cola director, 
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admitted that Coca-Cola “lost control of the situation to a certain extent” and stated, “the 
first couple of days of the crisis we didn’t know (the cause) and I humbly admit perhaps 
we should have said so more clearly” (Handyside, 1999).  
Its claims that the effects were short-term or even psychosomatic, attempts to 
reduce the offensiveness of the issue, also did not sit well with the public, especially 
those few victims who experienced long-term health problems. Even Ivester’s apology 
was not as well received as it would have been if he had given it the day after, or even 
several days after, the first reported illness. Similarly, the fact that he did not arrive at the 
scene of the crisis until ten days after it broke, and that he actually was in Paris at the 
time but went back to the U.S., seemed to suggest a serious lack of concern. A European 
PR executive commented that Coca-Cola gave “the impression of being more concerned 
about products than people,” when those people were still experiencing anxiety over the 
other recent contamination scares, and echoed Benoit (1997) by stressing, “it’s all about 
perception, not reality” (“Coca-Cola urged to heed,” 1999). In addition, these strategies 
used to restore the company’s image may have also ended up prolonging the crisis. For 
example, Hartley suggests that these initial failures in responding to the crisis may have 
made some publics “more receptive to antitrust allegations” (2001, p. 26), while as 
surveys showed, certain percentages of consumers remained reluctant to trust Coke again. 
The vice president of Britain’s Institute of Public Relations has suggested that the 
reason Coca-Cola did not respond very quickly was because it was “constrained by a lack 
of internal communications,” because as a multinational company its production was 
based in a different country from its operational management (Tomkins, 1999a, p. 25). 
Wakefield also cites this structure as a problem, noting that “Coca-Cola’s failure to 
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anticipate the crisis and its seriousness may have been couched in a deficient public 
relations structure” (2000, p. 65). 
At the center of this case is an international strategy that was no longer viable. 
Part of the problem faced by Coke seemed to result from an arrogance, or perhaps 
naivety, that believed that a universal global marketing approach was acceptable, a 
philosophy linked to former CEO Douglas Ivester. In Coca-Cola’s particular case, its 
image restoration strategies failed because of cultural differences, as strategies for its 
home country were rashly transplanted onto a foreign environment. As such, the 
explanations and promises Coca-Cola made “were not enough to satisfy cultures that seek 
order, predictability, and adherence to rules and laws” (Taylor, 2000, p. 289). Ivester’s 
rational worldview was therefore no longer effective in a global economy with 
unpredictable markets, regulation, and consumer anxiety (Sellers, 1999). Sellers explains 
the situation in the extreme: “Ivester and his acquisition team [saw] themselves as 
beneficent foreign investors…while regulators abroad view[ed] them as ugly Americans 
bent on Coca-Cola-nizing the planet” (1999, p. 74).  
Looking at Coca-Cola today, it is clear that it has successfully rebounded from 
this particular crisis, reaching the resolution stage, and it continues to be the marketing 
giant that the media says it is. Coca-Cola has since learned to use such a “multi-local” 
strategy to properly manage the cultural differences in its various markets, shifting more 
to the diplomatic style of its later CEOs like Daft. However, going through a crisis once 
does not make an organization immune to all future ones, as the Dasani case showed. As 
always, the nature of the global economy is unpredictable, and though some may theorize 
about what might be coming tomorrow, the best strategy is to have a plan for the 
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unthinkable, making the necessary preparations in the present so that future crises can be 
stopped in their infancy, because no organization wants to suffer the unpleasantness of a 
prolonged crisis, especially one whose effects will likely reach all around the globe. 
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CHAPTER THREE: The Magic’s Gone: 
The Marketing Mistake of Euro Disney in France
The Case of Euro Disney 
 
The Walt Disney Company found itself in a difficult marketing situation with its 
Euro Disney venture in the 1990s. The plan to open a new park near Paris, in the center 
of Europe, seemed like a great idea. Much planning and several billions of dollars went 
into the project, but the park failed to live up to its hype. Not only was it unable to meet 
revenue expectations, but it also created varying amounts of friction with French publics 
and ultimately was faced with the prospect of closure. The company received much 
criticism and corporate arrogance was argued to be a major source of the problem, as 
Disney tried to follow the same procedures that it had used for years with its American 
theme parks, only to find that these were incompatible with French culture. A critical 
reevaluation not only of its financial situation but also its marketing strategy followed. 
 The French are commonly known to be a proud people and sensitive about their 
culture. In their dealings with the European Union, they have been strong advocates for 
cultural protectionism, including restrictions on non-European imports of film, TV and 
music. American popular culture and the English language in particular have been seen as 
a major threat. Time magazine, however, noted that if there was anyone who could match 
the intense pride and protection of culture that the French possess, it was the Walt Disney 
Company (Rudolph & Gomez, 1991). Disney’s success had been based on its strict 
control over its ventures, accomplished due to its “highly systemized operations 
management and human resources management,” in which it held the highest confidence 
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(Grant, 2003, p. 259). The company thus had no qualms about “imposing intact its 
American standards of dress, behavior, and morality” on the French park (Laitamaki, as 
cited in Spencer, 1995, p. 107-8). 
This crisis represented the first major failure for Disney and new CEO Michael 
Eisner, who had been responsible for revitalizing the company in the past decade, 
boosting its market value of almost $2 billion in 1984 all the way up to $28 billion ten 
years later (Huey, 1995). Euro Disney was posting such enormous losses that its parent 
company had to postpone its royalty payments and even give the park more money so it 
could stay on its feet until it restructured its debt. This first non-franchise foray outside its 
home country was certainly looking problematic for a company that viewed the 
international stage as the future for theme parks and the “cornerstone of [its] international 
growth strategy” (Marr & Fowler, 2005, p. B1). 
Theme Park Background
Disney has experienced great success with its theme parks in California and 
Florida. By 1990, Disneyland and Disneyworld were attracting 2.7 million international 
visitors a year who spent $1.6 billion on Disney merchandise (Greenhouse, 1991). This, 
combined with the healthy market for Disney movies and merchandise, certainly seemed 
a good reason to expand its theme park operations overseas. After all, it had already 
opened up Tokyo Disneyland in Japan in 1983, which was bringing in sixteen million 
visitors by 1990 and earning profits of $150 million. Unfortunately for Disney, it had 
been reluctant to put forth a large investment in the Japanese park because it was so new 
and the culture so different, so a Japanese ownership group took a 100 percent stake in 
the project and reaped the rewards all by itself (Hartley, 2001).  
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Europe was decided on as the next destination for a Disney park, as its market 
accounted for twenty-five percent of revenue from Disney merchandise, and Paris finally 
edged out Barcelona for the prize of hosting Disney (Grant, 2003). Despite its more 
varied weather, Paris was a very central location, with 310 million people just a two-hour 
flight away, and the region had reasonable availability of land and a very good 
transportation system. Disney’s original budget for the park was $2 billion, but the 
company decided that the current American designs would not live up to the expectations 
of a continent where such things as castles and royalty were an essential part of the 
history, so the park’s budget eventually almost doubled (Spencer, 1995). The total cost of 
the project became $4.4 billion, and the park would cover 5,000 acres in Marne-la-
Vallee, twenty miles east of Paris (Hartley, 2001). Not wanting to make the same mistake 
of conservatism that it did in Japan, Disney opted for a forty-nine percent stake in the 
project, which was the highest allowed by the French government. However the company 
only put forth $160 million, receiving $1.2 billion in equity from other investors, while 
the remaining amount was paid for by loans from banks, the French government, and 
special partnerships (Greenhouse, 1991). Another mistake from its past that Disney 
sought to avoid was allowing others to profit by setting up hotels around the park, which 
had happened in California. Instead, Disney built six hotels with 5,200 rooms, in addition 
to a campground, an office complex, shopping malls, apartments, golf courses, and 
vacation homes (Gumbel & Turner, 1994). 
 The French government facilitated the project by providing a $750 million loan at 
below-market rates, while selling land to Disney at 1971 prices. It also invested millions 
to improve infrastructure reaching the park (Hartley, 2001). In return, the French 
Deleted: (Grant, 2003)
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government benefited from the possibility to create 30,000 new jobs and improve its 
unemployment rate, while its tourist industry would receive a major boost with an 
expected $1 billion a year from foreigners (Greenhouse, 1991).  
 
Great Expectations and a Tale of Two Cultures 
 
Disney certainly possessed the greatest confidence in its Euro Disney venture. It 
predicted eleven million visitors in its first year as a conservative estimate, rationalizing 
that if Europe’s 370 million people visited the park at the same rate as Americans flocked 
to the U.S. parks, there would be sixty million guests (Greenhouse, 1991). The fact that 
Europeans typically enjoyed five weeks of vacation instead of Americans’ two or three 
suggested a large potential for this number to increase. Estimated gross receipts for the 
first year of operation were $1.12 billion (Rudolph & Gomez, 1991). When shares in 
Euro Disney were offered to the public in October of 1989, the public was extremely 
eager to buy, as Disney’s track record and its ownership of forty-nine percent of shares 
seemed to offer much promise. The shares quickly increased their value leading up to the 
park’s opening (Curwen, 1995). 
Looming Problems
There were, however, several signs that this project would not be all smooth 
sailing, although Disney’s confidence brushed most of them aside. First of all, Disney 
was trying to succeed where others had failed; three $150 million amusement parks had 
been built in France in the past several years, all with high expectations, but instead they 
were failures—two of them bankrupt. Disney was not fazed by this, believing that its 
twenty-two billion franc investment would make its park far superior to the other parks 
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with their meager investments of 700 million francs (Greenhouse, 1991). In fact, the 
Disney heads were not at all worried about how large the park would be, but rather that it 
would be too small for the multitude of visitors that would flock to it; Euro Disney 
chairman Robert Fitzpatrick admitted that his “biggest fear” was that the park would be 
“too successful” (Greenhouse, 1991, p. 1).   
 As thorough as Disney was in its planning of the park, it seemed to shrug off the 
cultural concerns that were being raised in France due to its new product. It had made 
some initial efforts to cater to the local culture; the original Euro Disney chairman, 
Robert Fitzpatrick, was selected because he was an American who spoke French and was 
familiar with Europe, and was even married to a French woman. Disney also received 
assistance from local consultants for its dealings with French officials, as Fitzpatrick was 
aware that “form is very important in France” (Rudolph & Gomez, 1991, p. 49). 
However, Euro Disney ended up with some problems with its contractors, as two filed for 
bankruptcy during construction, so the company had to pay additional subcontractors to 
finish the work of the original two (Gumbel & Turner, 1994). The company also ran into 
trouble with many contractors who were demanding unpaid bills for additional work due 
to changed plans, although the company rejected those claims (“French far right,” 1992). 
Other cultural considerations included the decision by Disney executives that 
there would be two official languages of the park, French and English, and that there 
would be multilingual guides and a variety of accented characters in order to appeal to a 
range of cultures. Some attractions would stress European roots, such as a Discoveryland, 
based on the French writer Jules Verne, and Sleeping Beauty and Snow White would 
both have French names (Greenhouse, 1991). 
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The park itself was not the only factor that needed to be considered, however. The 
proud French felt affronted by the actions of the Disney executives during the planning 
process, who seemed “brash, insensitive, and overbearing,” an attitude that did not help 
things to run smoothly both before and after the opening (Gumbel & Turner, 1994, p. 
A1). Reportedly, the Disney people’s response to everything seemed to be, ‘Do as we 
say, because we know best’” (Gumbel & Turner, 1994, p. A1). Even though Fitzpatrick 
had often warned that “France should not be approached as if it were Florida,” this advice 
generally went unheeded (Hartley, 2001, p. 214). 
In addition, there was also a fair amount of discontent voiced in the press by 
French intellectuals regarding Euro Disney’s threat to French culture. Although Disney 
executives were eager to point out the European origins of many popular Disney film 
characters, for certain members of the French public this was just America 
“appropriat[ing]” European stories and “selling them back…in sanitized form” (Phillips, 
1993, p. 47). The term “cultural Chernobyl,” was popularized by a Parisian theater 
director, Ariane Mnouchkine (Rees, 1992, p. 57), while the park was also called “a 
Trojan horse of American culture” (Fawcett, 1992, p. 13). The French National Front 
party, a right-wing group, alleged that Disney was “acting…as if it were in occupied 
territory” and that it “want[ed] to impose its own laws” (“French far right,” 1992). These 
voices represented only a minority of the population, however, but some of their 
allegations, particularly those of American arrogance and strict regulations, were more 
widely held. Even French president François Mitterand, while approving the park to 
satisfy economic goals for the country, did state that it was “just not my cup of tea” 
(Eisner, 1998, p. 285). 
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Another issue with the park was how to compare it to the one in Japan. Disney’s 
construction manager for the French park had studied Tokyo Disneyland for two years 
after it opened to determine ways that its construction could have been better, and the 
company used that knowledge to ensure that Euro Disney was built on time. One major 
finding was that there should be covered waiting areas for lines due to the issue of 
weather, which would not be the perpetual sunshine enjoyed in Florida and California 
(Greenhouse, 1991). French winters, however, tend to be rainier and slightly colder than 
in Japan. Nevertheless, during an early meeting an executive questioned whether the 
French would queue up under such conditions, and he was simply assured that “the 
Japanese do” (Solomon & Stanger, 1994, p. 36). 
There was one factor, however, that was not considered, which was the cultural
identity of the Japanese park. Disneyland Tokyo is not an American corporation located
in another country, like Euro Disney, because Disney does not possess any ownership of
it—the Japanese do. As such, it is “an American product sold by a Japanese company,”
meaning that the Japanese company, which knows its target market intimately, has
control of marketing the park (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 478). The park was thus
designed with the Japanese fascination with American culture in mind—even to the point
of having only one Japanese restaurant (Hartley, 2001). Euro Disney, on the other hand,
had to deal with marketing the park not only to the French, but also to the rest of the
European continent, whose tastes vary widely.
Grand Opening, But Not Grand Enough -- Mickey’s in the Red 
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Euro Disney planned for a huge celebration for the opening day on April 12, 
1992. It hosted an enormous gala for the press during the preceding weekend, which was 
attended by 2,500 people, giving global media exposure to the park’s opening (Fawcett, 
1992). There was also a $10 million opening ceremony that featured an international cast 
of celebrities like Cher, Peter Gabriel, Jane Seymour, Jean-Claude Van Damme, and 
Eddie Murphy, to name but a few. This two-hour-long event was broadcast to twenty-two 
countries (Lainsbury, 2000). Meanwhile, a single $220 million marketing campaign had 
been launched across Europe, which included corporate partnerships with European and 
American companies, and even a “Disney Club” Sunday morning children’s show on 
several TV stations across Europe focusing on the park itself (Riding, 1992; Lainsbury, 
2000, p. 89).  
The night before the park opened, however, a bomb placed by protestors exploded 
near an electricity pylon, cutting off power to several hotels briefly but not affecting the 
opening. The next day there was a rail strike instigated by the General Confederation of 
Labor, a union associated with the Communist party (Cohen, 1992a). Euro Disney 
initially faced some problems with visits from Paris in the following weeks because of 
the strike and the resulting fear of traffic jams. Due to Disney policy no attendance 
records were released, but the company did reveal that there had been 1.5 million visitors 
in its first seven weeks, but that it could not make any assumptions from that number. 
However, the company did state that it might not be profitable in the fiscal year ending in 
September, which resulted in a drop of Euro Disney stock of five percent, taking it more 
than twenty percent below its price at the park’s opening (Cohen, 1992b). Indeed, the 
company ended up reporting a net loss of $34.4 million, and a further loss of $203 
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million in the first half of the next fiscal year, despite meeting its first year target of 
eleven million visitors just two weeks late (“Euro Disney posts loss,” 1992; Cohen, 
1993).  
Despite the high fanfare and expectations, there were several factors that put a 
crimp in Euro Disney’s plans for success. First of all, its pricing structure was proving a 
major problem, because the company had assumed that visitors would pay the lofty prices 
because of high demand, and it still kept them in place in order to reach revenue targets. 
However, while these plans were made during a boom period, the opening occurred 
during the middle of a major recession across Europe, and so consumers were less likely 
to spend, even bringing their own lunches. Falling exchange rates also meant that trips 
were more expensive for those visitors from outside France. Admission prices were 
higher than at the American parks, and the premium Disney hotels cost as much per night 
as an upscale hotel in Paris and were barely half full. Also, because Paris was less than an 
hour away, many of the park’s guests simply spent the night in one of the city’s many 
hotels (Hartley, 2001). In fact, the amount of money spent on trip to Euro Disney was so 
high that a U.K. resident could take a vacation at Disney World in Florida and spend 
about the same amount (Crumley & Fisher, 1994). The high prices were also putting off 
many European tour operators, some of whom were further offended by a lack of 
partnership extended by the company and threatened a boycott (“French coach 
operators,” 1992).  
Another component of the problem stemmed from the very nature of the park 
itself. According to a French investment banker involved with the project, Disney 
attempted to make the European park the same as its American ones, as a “vacation 
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place,” but Europeans would look more for “a show,” something they can do in a day, 
because of their different notion of what a vacation is (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 480). 
A typical European vacation does last for several weeks, but on a much more moderate 
budget than in the U.S. and in more modest accommodations. Visitors were thus staying 
for fewer days at Euro Disney, an average of two, with one night in a hotel. Meanwhile, 
Disney’s operations in sunny Florida and California, which had additional parks and 
activities to keep guests occupied, while also offering Europeans the novelty of visiting 
the U.S., enjoyed average visits of four days (Hartley, 2001). Another factor was that 
European parents were generally stricter about school attendance due to the different 
education system and would therefore be unlikely to whisk their children away from 
school for a vacation getaway, as Americans might do (Spencer, 1995). 
There were several cultural misreads, or mistakes of commission, at the park level 
as well. Euro Disney did not sell alcohol anywhere in the park, despite the seemingly 
obvious prominent role of wine in French culture (Hartley, 2001). Another marketing 
blunder was the preponderance of upscale sit-down restaurants and classy gift shops, 
while European visitors were often more apt to choose fast food on the go and purchase 
the simple souvenirs common in the U.S. The hotels also ran into trouble initially by 
having limited facilities of coffee and croissants for breakfasts, whereas the majority of 
guests showed up for a full sit-down meal (Phillips, 1993). Euro Disney shelled out extra 
money to build an elaborate tram system from the hotels to the park, but the European 
guests preferred to walk instead (Herbig, 1998). Some people were also confused as to 
the cultural identity of the park, noting that Disney had not “figured out whether it’s 
going to be an American park, a French park, or a European park” (Grant, 2003, p. 271). 
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Strained Relations with Employees and the Press
Disney had originally asked that the French government allow Euro Disney to be 
exempted from following French labor laws so that it could apply the same practices as in 
the U.S. One of these included the prevention of unionization, although in France unions 
are a stronger social force than anything else, so their complaints over Disney 
employment policies did not help Euro Disney’s public image (Packman & Casmir, 
1999). 
One of the biggest points of contention was Euro Disney’s dress code policy, 
known as the “Disney look,” which created what some called a “struggle between French 
individualism and American conformism (Kuisel, as cited in Forman, 1998, p. 253). 
Employees even nicknamed the park “Mouseschwitz” for these strict codes, which 
prohibited everything from dyed hair, smoking and gum chewing to inappropriate 
underwear, and workers gave accounts of “undercover” employees who would keep track 
of this (Phillips, 1993, p. 47). By the end of May 1992, less than two months after 
opening, Disney reported that 1,000 of its 16,000 workers had left, although slightly less 
than half of them did so voluntarily. An industry newspaper, however, reported that the 
number was 3,000, and that the reasons included low pay and poor conditions, though 
this was denied (Turner, 1992). Another issue with the Disney Look was the insistence 
that a smile also be worn as well, but the idea of high-level American service “with a 
smile” seemed lost on many French employees. According to one staff member, “the 
French don’t understand [being smiled at]. They think they are being taken for idiots” 
(Rees, 1992, p. 58).  
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Disney was also unable to predict what days would be most popular, and the 
attendance would vary wildly, leading to a need for employee layoffs during the low 
season, which ran afoul of France’s “inflexible labor schedules” (Hartley, 2001, p. 216). 
In addition, while overestimating many factors, one thing Disney underestimated was the 
number of bus drivers, resulting in a busy day rush of 2,000 drivers for a restroom made 
for fifty people (Hartley, 2001). 
According to journalists, Disney was very strict about access to their information, 
creating many hoops to jump through to get an interview. Some even complained that 
they were “treated like school children” (Fawcett, 1992, p. 15). It is interesting to note 
that just as Disney failed to adjust their marketing style to their various European 
audiences, it also neglected to modify its dealings with the press to a more European 
approach. For example, the vice-chairman of the Association of Foreign Correspondents 
in Paris described the offense taken by many of her fellow European journalists, who 
were “not used to being told to whom they may and may not speak, and…were amazed 
by the autocratic manner in which [they] were treated” (Fawcett, 1992, p. 15). This was 
yet another manifestation of Disney’s mistake of omission, and it would not help improve 
Disney’s image in the press.  
This was especially true since Euro Disney also became “the focal point for anti-
American gripes” (Tempest, 1992, p. A14). A prominent example of this was a huge 
protest by French farmers outside the park in June 1992, which effectively blockaded the 
entrance. They had come to protest new regulations of the European Community on 
agricultural subsidies, upon which the U.S. had had some influence, and declared that 
Euro Disney was “the symbol of an American culture that has invaded [their] land” 
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(Tempest, 1992, p. A14). The public relations woes worsened as the European press 
jumped on the Disney-bashing bandwagon. A letter in London’s Independent called Euro 
Disney “America’s cultural Vietnam,” presenting its problems as justice for its arrogant 
efforts to Disnify the world (Lawson, 1993, p. 20). Satirical cartoons also depicted such 
sights as Mickey panhandling in front of the Eiffel Tower (Solomon & Stanger, 1994). 
Focusing on the Problem
The main problem was that although Europeans were greatly enamored with the 
park itself, making it the biggest paid tourist attraction in Europe, they were not spending 
nearly enough to match the projected revenue and profits (Hartley, 2001). Disney had 
expected the break-even point to come between seven and eight million visitors, but it 
soon became clear that this was a huge underestimate (Turner & Gumbel, 1992). It was 
not uncommon for theme parks to have shaky starts, but the unfavorable press and the 
fact that some people seemed pleased to see the park struggle were an additional bad 
omen and a “severe blow to Disney pride” (Lainsbury, 2000, p. 110). 
As part of an emergency management strategy, Disney brought in a group of 
American business experts to evaluate the enterprise. According to one of these experts, 
the primary obstacle was that CEO Michael Eisner did not believe that there was actually 
a problem and felt that the situation would eventually smooth itself out. Furthermore, 
while numerous news publications blamed Euro Disney’s troubles on cultural miscues, 
Disney placed sole responsibility on the current economic recession in Europe (Packman 
& Casmir, 1999).  
A German marketing professional declared that “the entire marketing 
strategy…was to blame” (Crumley & Fisher, 1994, p. 39). Euro Disney’s director of sales 
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and marketing in the UK admitted that there were “naïve assumptions made about the 
European consumer,” as Disney had viewed Europe as a “homogeneous market,” a major 
mistake of commission (Marsh, 1996, p. 14). Disney’s annual report for 1993 
acknowledged that the recession was not the only problem; overpricing and sub-par 
marketing were also cited. It called for lower prices and new rides, and set forth a goal of 
streamlining management (Curwen, 1995). Disney Chairman Michael Eisner called the 
park the company’s “first real financial disappointment,” as it lost $921 million in its first 
fiscal year, even with 17 million guests (“Euro Disney’s performance,” 1993). By the end 
of 1993, Euro Disney had lost $1.03 billion, and rumors of closure abounded in the press 
(Hartley, 2001). 
Although Euro Disney was losing more than $2.5 million per day in its first year, 
this actually came from non-operating costs, as it was still making an operating profit 
(Hartley, 2001). The problem came from the high sunk costs of its elaborate construction 
and the rising interest rates from its many loans. Disney had hoped to sell its hotels and 
other land to private investors because of the large amount of interest factoring into its 
costs, but the low occupancy rates and a slumping French real estate market due to the 
European recession made this impossible for the time being (Hartley, 2001). High interest 
rates also postponed its plans for an adjoining second park and convention center, which 
was a major hindrance to long-term plans because these would have provided incentive 
for guests to stay for multiple days and occupy the hotels (Curwen, 1995).  
The Walt Disney Company gave the park $175 million to keep things running, 
while Euro Disney sought to restructure and refinance its high-interest $2.9 billion in 
bank loans, which had been pushing the venture’s breakeven point further and further 
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into the future (Hartley, 2001). Disney finally stated itself that if it could not work out a 
restructuring for Euro Disney by the end of March 1994, the park would have to close 
(Curwen, 1995). 
 
Wishing Upon a Star -- Revenue Turnaround 
 
By 1994, Disney was reducing prices for everything from off-season admission to 
hotel rooms and merchandise. The new strategy revolved around the two ideals of 
“efficiency and economy” (Gumbel, 1994, p. A14). Examples including nearly halving 
the amount of merchandise in stores, offering simpler American Disney products, as well 
as cutting 900 jobs by a much needed streamlining of its operations. Euro Disney also 
retrained its 9,000 full-time employees, specifically in customer service abilities, which 
included intensive language lessons (Hartley, 2001). 
Rescued by Banks -- and a Prince
On March 15, 1994, two weeks before the deadline, Euro Disney and its banks 
reached an agreement to make the park profitable by September 30, 1995. European 
banks would offer an additional $500 million and agree to forgive eighteen months’ 
interest and defer principal payments for three years. Disney’s part of the deal was to dish 
out $750 million toward the effort and suspend its generous management fees and 
royalties from ticket and merchandise sales for five years (Hartley, 2001).  
A welcome addition to Euro Disney’s turnaround efforts was a $500 million 
investment by Prince Alwaleed, a member of the Saudi royal family who had a history of 
saving ventures on the brink of failure, in return for twenty-four percent ownership of the 
park (Hartley, 2001). This was a huge boost for confidence in the company, as it showed 
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great faith in the recovery and eventual success of the park. In addition, Prince Alwaleed 
also agreed to finance $100 million toward a new convention center at Euro Disneyland, 
as the park’s current convention offerings were already in high demand (Turner & 
Coleman, 1994). 
Euro Disney posted a $350 million net loss for the fiscal year ending in 
September 1994, which was about sixty percent less than the previous year, although it 
was still struggling, as it had attracted ten percent fewer visitors to the park, whose 
individual spending had dropped ten francs a person. Nevertheless, the new chairman, 
Phillipe Bourguignon, a Frenchman who had replaced Fitzpatrick in 1993, still sought to 
break even by 1996 (“Euro Disney registers,” 1994).  
Euro Disney’s losses continued to decrease through the beginning of 1995 as 
attendance started to rise again following price reductions of up to twenty percent on 
everything from admission and food to hotel rooms, while the new $150 million Space 
Mountain attraction was also a huge draw. The opening of the English Channel tunnel 
and new high-speed rail lines helped as well. Waiting times for attractions had also been 
cut down by forty-five percent (Grant, 2003). Prices were further reduced during the 
winter season and instead of celebrating American holidays there would be special events 
for European days like Bastille Day (Phillips, 1993).  
Euro Disney also reworked its marketing strategy to launch different campaigns 
in different countries, including several joint promotions, such as one with British 
airways to offer a special two-day package to the park (Marsh, 1996). In addition, a new 
strategy was the renaming of the park to Disneyland Paris, in order to disassociate it from 
the stuffier business connotations and cultural identity questions of the word “Euro,” as 
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well as to distance itself from the negative image that “Euro Disney” had come to 
represent, especially in the press. It also helped to tie the park to the city of Paris in the 
public’s mind and basically represented an opportunity for rebirth for the company, 
which would still be known as Euro Disney (Eisner, 1998; Godwin, 1994; Grant, 2003).  
At last, Euro Disney posted its first profits of $35.36 million in the third quarter of 
the fiscal year ending September 1995, compared to the previous year’s third quarter loss 
of $113.6 million (Nash, 1995). For that entire fiscal year, Disney had a profit of $23 
million, a significant improvement from the last year’s loss of $371 million, as theme 
park revenue increased eight percent and hotel revenue by sixteen, and at 68.5 percent the 
occupancy rate had surpassed those of French hotel chains (“Euro Disney reports,” 1995).  
A Swan Emerges
In 1995, the Walt Disney Company’s acquired Capitol Cities/ABC Inc. for $10 
billion, a deal that suggested many possibilities for the future, particularly in the 
international arena. CEO Michael Eisner suggested that this would include building 
theme parks in South America and Asia. In 1997, Giles Pellisson, a man of international 
experience, educated both at Harvard and the French business school ESSEC, took over 
the presidency of Euro Disney. Also that year the second-to-last stage of the Tour de 
France, commencing the final day of the race, took place in Disneyland Paris, and the 
cyclists were housed in the Disney hotels the night before. This honor from such an 
emblematic event in French culture certainly suggested that the park had become 
accepted as a part of the French landscape and even culture (Dejevskey, 1996). 
Net profit had also increased 7.5 percent for the fiscal year 1997, to $36.1 million, 
even in the face of rising debt payments to be made, as revenues continued to grow with a 
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7.7 percent rise in guests, many attracted by the park’s numerous special events for its 
fifth anniversary (“Euro Disney net profit,” 1997). This progress led a Salomon Brothers 
analyst to comment that although “Euro Disney might still look like an ugly little 
duck…a swan is emerging” (Fondiller, 1997, p. 16C). 
For the fiscal year 1997-98, net profit rose dramatically by thirty-four percent to 
$51.7 million despite a slight drop in the number of visitors (“Euro Disney profit,” 1998). 
Euro Disney would still have 12.5 million guests in 1998, making it France’s top tourist 
attraction yet again, with the largest representation coming from the French, who made 
up forty percent of all visitors (Hartley, 2001; Packman & Casmir, 1999). The next year, 
however, would commence the payment of royalties and other fees to the Walt Disney 
Company. This caused profits to make a complete reversal in 1998-99, falling 46.6 
percent to $24.78 million despite increases in average visitor expenditure and hotel 
occupancy (“Euro Disney profits,” 1999). Net profits would still rise the following fiscal 
year, up to $33.2 million, as a result of higher spending per visitor (Prada, 2000).  
 
Not Quite Happily Ever After 
 
Thus Euro Disney was eventually able to get on its feet and consistently generate 
a profit for several years running. The Euro Disney story became an example and 
reminder to the Disney Corporation of its ability to achieve success against great odds. It 
was also a lesson about paying attention to the needs of foreign cultures, and as a result 
the company was now seeking “to meet deeper cultural values instead of simply 
matching cultural norms” (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 482). In light of these positive 
signs, the company saw fit to finally expand its theme park offerings again. 
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Unfortunately, despite its comeback in the late 1990s, Euro Disney would still find itself 
facing future challenges due to its pre-existing burden of debt and royalty payments.  
New Plans
Disney announced in 1999 that it would build a $642 million movie theme park, 
Disney Studios, next to Euro Disney, which opened in 2002. The French government 
agreed to pay for some additional infrastructure and an employee training center in return 
for the 5,000 new jobs that would be created. Meanwhile, though Disney would finance 
the park through additional long-term loans from a French financial institution, the 
expanded attraction was estimated to draw in 4.2 million more visitors a year (Fleming, 
1999). The new park aimed to be much more European in nature, to the satisfaction of the 
French public, including virtual tours guided by European actors speaking in their native 
tongues, and a Swiss architect and set designer was used as a consultant on the project. 
Due to high occupancy rates at its hotels, Euro Disney also built seven new ones. A new 
marketing strategy was employed, using travel agents, who controlled a major part of the 
market, to help sell the new park, something Euro Disney did not do for the first one 
(Prada & Orwall, 2002). 
However, the new park went on to suffer from some of the same problems as the 
old one, though they were not so culturally rooted. Guests often complained that there 
were not enough attractions and that the entry fee was too high. Also, Euro Disney still 
had a substantial amount of debt-- $2.9 billion-- to repay, and the extra $642 million did 
not help. In addition, there were some unforeseen factors that adversely affected the 
park’s performance, including the slow tourism seasons after September 11 and a major 
heat wave in the summer of 2003. As a result, Euro Disney posted a net loss of $33.5 
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million in 2002, and by mid-2003 it was threatened with bankruptcy as losses grew 69.2 
percent (Garrahan & Hearn, 2002; “Euro Disney reports losses,” 2003). In 2004 it had a 
record loss of almost $190 million, having only attracted 2.2 million visitors to Disney 
Studios (Wrighton & Orwall, 2005). The company thus had to undergo another 
agreement with Disney and its creditor banks. Part of this involved an increase of shares 
from one billion to 3.8 billion, in an attempt to obtain a capital increase of 253 million 
euros. Disney put forth 100 million euros worth while also forgiving and further deferring 
some more debts and royalty payments (Wrighton & Orwall, 2005). Euro Disney planned 
on new attractions, which included an updated Space Mountain ride, a Buzz Lightyear 
experience, Tower of Terror ride, and a new Toon Studios in the Disney Studios park, to 
help bring in more visitors. There have been some signs of improvement, as by the first 
quarter of the 2004-2005 fiscal year sales had increased three percent to $348 million 
(“Euro Disney shares,” 2005).  
Disney had also reached an agreement with Hong Kong in 1999 to construct a 
Disney theme park, on Lantua Island, just west of Hong Kong, which opened in 
September 2005. Of the total cost of $3.6 billion, Disney only put forth $316 million for 
forty-three percent ownership, while the Hong Kong government invested $419 million 
in addition to $1.75 billion for infrastructure. The rest came from government and bank 
loans. The deal was particularly favorable to the sagging Hong Kong economy as 18,400 
jobs were created in the first year with 35,800 more to come later. Disney planned to 
make the park smaller and created only 2,100 hotel rooms, due to estimates of five 
million visitors a year (Landler, 1999). Disney also made several cultural concessions, 
including Asian food at restaurants, correct feng shui, the adjustment of several rides to 
51
suit local tastes, and the creation of the Fantasy Gardens, home of the Chinese Disney 
character Mulan, as the main attraction of the park (Fowler & Marr, 2005). 
The park has started a little slowly, missing its 5.6 million attendance target for 
the first year by about a month, due to several setbacks including challenges with crowds 
during the Chinese New Year holiday (Fowler, 2006). Disney’s plans for another Chinese 
park suggest their confidence that this venture will be eventually prove a success, but 
only time will tell. 
 
Conclusion -- Disney Deals With a Small World After All 
 
Just as with Coca-Cola, it is amazing to see how such a major marketer as Disney 
could manage to err so greatly. It might be said that Disney’s perceived strength became 
its weakness in this particular case, as its confidence and belief in the superiority of its 
operations failed to impress the French. In fact, “the tendency of Disney officials to 
maintain their tradition and established procedure clashed with the tendency present in 
French culture to protect its own” (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 478).  
Although the hostility projected by French intellectuals seemed to have little 
impact on the French public’s embracing of the park, some of the problems stemmed 
from a “different type of culture clash,” resulting from that “brash, frequently insensitive 
and often overbearing style” of Disney’s corporate culture (Gumbel & Turner, 1994, p. 
A1). Christian Cardon, the French government official who headed negotiations with 
Disney, remarked that “our backing for the project always stemmed from social and 
economic considerations, never from cultural ones” (Cohen, 1993, p. 1). Particularly 
through its early marketing campaign, Disney had “insulted Europeans with its imagery 
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of American-style bigness,” and its ads emphasized the park’s enormous size without 
informing about specific characters and attractions (Crumley & Fisher, 1994, p. 39). It 
did not help that many French felt threatened by the kind of cultural hegemony that 
Disney represented as such a strong symbol of America. 
According to Hartley (2001), Disney possessed “the arrogance of success,” by 
which it did not think it necessary to modify its previous strategies in a new environment, 
thus committing its major mistake of omission (p. 222). One employee claimed that the 
company did not even want to use the metric system (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 478). 
Numerous Disney executives have admitted such arrogance, saying they were confident 
that “people [would] come— on our terms” (Gumbel & Turner, 1994, p. A1). Disney’s 
community relations manager had exuded confidence about the park, saying, “we knew it 
would work because it had worked everywhere else” (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 479). 
The strength of the brand was seen as a stamp of success; current Euro Disney CEO Jay 
Rasulo has commented that they thought “it was enough to be Disney” (Prada & Orwall, 
2002, p. B1). Any doubts seemed to be assuaged by the fact that so much money was 
being put into making the park as elaborate and refined as possible, due to the rather 
stereotypical notion that “‘Lacoste and Polo loving’ Europeans would not tolerate 
anything unsophisticated or cheap” (Grant, 2003, p. 272). As Rasulo recalled, however, 
the realization would come later that “guests need to be welcomed on the basis of their 
own culture and travel habits” (Prada & Orwall, 2002, p. B1).  
 The success of Tokyo Disneyland also built up Disney’s expectations. In 1992, 
the park had earned $200 million even in the face of a Japanese recession, while the Walt 
Disney Company itself only made $299 million altogether (Spencer, 1995). However, 
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there are vast differences between Japanese and French culture that should have been 
apparent. For one thing, the Japanese theme park is extremely faithful to the American 
parks, which works well in a country fascinated with other cultures, which had few 
objections to building such a park. Furthermore, there are at least one hundred theme 
parks in Japan already, most of which have foreign themes, compared to the handful in 
France (“Tokyo Disneyland has no crisis,” 1992). Demographics also differentiated the 
Japanese park; Tokyo had triple the population of Paris and a fifty percent higher per 
capita income (Herbig, 1998). Perhaps it was no surprise that Tokyo Disneyland did not 
have any of the problems that occurred at Euro Disney. 
Moreover, the past mistakes that Disney originally sought to rectify when 
planning Euro Disney came from ventures in American and Japanese markets, not a 
European one. In an article in the Journal of International Marketing, Earl P. Spencer 
(1995) cites Disney’s well-known “determination to never make the same mistake twice,” 
which has resulted in “new problems [being] frequently overlooked or misjudged” (p. 
106). Although Disney learned it should own the hotels outside the park from Disney 
World in Florida, and that it should own the park itself from Tokyo Disneyland, there 
were many problems that it was left unprepared for when Euro Disney was built. As a 
result, Disney not only led the way for other American businesses that decided to open 
their own parks in Europe, but it gave them the advantage of learning from Disney’s 
mistakes of commission. For example, Tussauds and Anheuser-Busch decided not to 
include hotels as part of their Port Aventura park in Spain after seeing what happened to 
the Disney hotels (Tagliabue, 1995). 
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Disney today is one of the top media conglomerates in the world, but Euro Disney 
is still in question. Perhaps it dug itself in too big of a hole by investing so much into the 
venture—that American-style bigness may have proved too much. However, due to the 
park’s tourist draw and its role as the largest employer in the Paris region, with 43,000 
workers, unemployment-plagued France has too much to lose if it allows Euro Disney to 
go under, which will ensure that it stays in business for the near future (Wrighton & 
Orwall, 2005). Disney’s American theme parks seem to suffer none of the problems that 
their foreign counterpart has, but the company is aware that the American theme park 
market is a mature one, while in other countries they are operating in the early stages of 
the product lifecycle, which still needs to develop (Garrahan, 2005, p. 30). Disney has 
gained some insight from its mistakes with Euro Disney, as it sought to make its new 
Disney Studios park and Disneyland Hong Kong less extravagant and more in tune with 
the local culture. It now sees itself as a company “dedicated to change, employee 
empowerment and cultural respect and appreciation” (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 482). 
However, it still needs to be extremely careful to analyze all parts of the market in its 
future endeavors, because another crisis like Euro Disney could turn all of Disney’s 
hopes for further international theme park expansion into fantasy.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Looking Ahead: 
The Digital Age and the Rising Markets of the East
Having seen examples from the past of failures in international business 
communication, we now turn toward the future to examine what one can reasonably 
expect to encounter from a globalized world. There are two major trends that are already 
ever-present in today’s world and only stand to increase in the next few decades. The first 
is the move toward digitalization, with the Internet becoming the new medium of choice. 
Secondly, we are seeing a rise of activity from developing economies, as they strive not 
only to join but also succeed in the global market.  
 
The Future Lies in the Internet 
 
We have now entered the era that Thomas Friedman calls “Globalization 3.0,” 
where “thanks to digitization, miniaturization, virtualization, personalization, and 
wireless, [anyone] can be processing, collecting, or transmitting voice or data from 
anywhere to anywhere” (2005, p. 168). The digital revolution has truly changed the way 
the world does business. In the beginning, companies set up websites, which gradually 
became more extensive and elaborate and allowed users from all over the world to buy 
products and services online. Furthermore, the Internet has allowed these companies to 
control and track every aspect of their business with the click of a mouse. The most adept 
of these companies have realized that this allows them to provide customized service to 
consumers, by actually enabling their customers to “serve themselves in their own 
way…according to their own tastes” (for a simple example, think of Dell computers), 
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creating what Friedman (2005) calls the “self-directed consumer” (p. 350-51). Companies 
are thus able to meet the needs of their clients, as well as their own needs, in ways never 
before thought possible. 
In addition to these uses by more traditional organizations, a number of 
businesses have sprung up as a direct result of the digitalization of the world to offer 
services that would also be unthinkable otherwise. There are those who provide the 
infrastructure and hardware for this new technology, but there are also those companies 
that thrive on the very bonds that the Internet creates with every other part of the world. 
Examples include search engines like Google and Yahoo, auction sites like eBay, and 
networking sites like MySpace, whose products can include intangible things like 
knowledge or friendship (Battelle, 2005). These companies too are taking advantage of 
global markets, as eBay now receives fifty-one percent of its revenue from outside the 
U.S., while seventy-five percent of Google’s page views occur in other countries (Hof, 
2006).  
In terms of communication, this age of digitalization is an unbelievable boon, 
particularly for business corporations. First off, the Internet allows “unfiltered positions” 
to be heard by bypassing the traditional agenda setting conducted by media gatekeepers 
(Sparks-Fitzgerald & Spagnolia, 1999, p. 12). In addition, the two-way flow of 
communication it offers allows for significant feedback, often almost instantaneously, as 
is the case with blogs and discussion boards. This speed of the Internet is also greatly 
beneficial to corporations, particularly in the case of a crisis, as it allows quicker reaction 
times as well as wide dissemination of information (Sparks-Fitzgerald & Spagnolia, 
1999). At the same time, however, this also opens up access to new users from 
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completely different cultures whose needs may need to be addressed, as with any 
company doing business outside of its home market.  
 
The Future Lies in Markets of Growing Economies 
 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, several parts of the world were making 
the transition from a closed economy to a free market system, such as China, India, 
Russia, and Eastern Europe. By 2000, the “global economic world,” the amount of the 
world’s population participating in global trade, reached six billion people, compared to 
2.5 billion in 1985. As it happened, this coincided with the digital revolution that was 
“flattening” the world, thus not only leveling the playing field, but also bringing that field 
directly to these new players (Friedman, 2005, p. 181-82). 
The one country that seems as if it will have the greatest effect on the world’s 
future is the most populous nation, China. Like many of these new economies, China is 
experiencing an “emerging capitalist class,” one that possesses an ambitious and positive 
attitude toward the future (O’Leary, 2007a, p. 12). This is still a small segment of 
Chinese society, concentrated in major cities like Shanghai and Beijing, which are in the 
first tier of China’s four-tier economic classification system. The main growth in 
consumption in the long run will actually come from those in the lower tiers as they 
undergo a rapid urbanization and industrialization as China prepares to create a multitude 
of new landmark cities in the next few decades (O’Leary, 2007a).  
As a nation with a strong history of innovation and prominence, China seems to 
be exhibiting “ambitions to catch up to its rightful place in modern consumer society” 
(O’Leary, 2007a, p. 14), and there are many indicators of the takeoff of middle class 
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consumer spending. Credit card ownership is at twelve million compared to three million 
two years ago; meanwhile, 4.1 million of China’s 100 million cars were sold in 2006. 
Another important consideration is that this is the generation of “Little Emperors,” the 
single children born out of Mao’s population control policies, who have been raised “with 
a sense of consumer entitlement” (O’Leary, 2007a, p. 16).  
Chinese consumers are particularly attracted to luxury items, considering them to 
be marks of status, especially in a country where the idea of “face” is very important. 
Goldman Sachs has reported that China will pass Japan as the largest luxury market in 
2015, with a twenty-nine percent share (O’Leary, 2007a). However, there is still a 
demand for “culturally relevant products” (Fowler & Marr, 2005, p. B1). Thus the reason 
for the trend toward conducting research and development in China itself, as Proctor & 
Gamble has done through an affiliation with the prestigious Tsinghua University in 
Beijing, while L’Oreal has set up its own R&D facility in Shanghai to focus solely on the 
Chinese consumer (O’Leary, 2007a; O’Leary, 2007b).  
China’s budding consumers are also merging with the Internet, which is enabling 
them to do a wide variety of things with an even wider amount of information. The 
Internet has certainly contributed to the growing capitalism among the Chinese, as $36 
billion was spent online in 2006 (O’Leary, 2007c). Furthermore, it has a great 
democratizing power in a still authoritarian nation; Google’s Kai-Fu Lee, head of 
Chinese operations, predicts that the Internet will “level the playing field for China’s 
enormous rural underclass” (Thompson, 2006, p. 64), particularly for students, who can 
access educational materials from around the globe. Chinese Internet use grew by twenty-
three percent in 2006 to 137 million users, which is 10.5 percent of the population, and it 
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is predicted to surpass the U.S. in the next two years to become the largest Internet 
market in the world (O’Leary, 2007c). 
Many Chinese also believe that the Internet will change Chinese politics, making 
the process more transparent (Schrage, 2006). According to Kai-Fu Lee, however, the 
Internet’s ability for public speech appeals more on the level of personal expression 
rather than political expression (Thompson, 2006). Although there may be a growing 
sense of individualism, it is a “peer-endorsed individualism,” tying back to that concept 
of “face” (O’Leary, 2007b, p. 25). Even with politics aside, the Internet revolution in 
China can at least be described as one of “self-actualization,” with the new ability to 
speak publicly about a variety of topics becoming part of a “daily act” (Thompson, 2006, 
p. 64).  
China certainly presents a very complex case, however, for any corporation that 
desires to do business with it, as it is considered to have as many as 31 different markets 
(Chang, 2007), although these are also spending more than $700 billion (O’Leary, 
2007b). China’s authoritarian structure also poses a moral quandary for many firms, but 
the country’s economic stature and promise usually leave little choice, even for a 
company like Google whose motto is “Don’t be evil.” 
 
Google: A Case Study for the Future 
 
Google is a perfect example of a company that is taking advantage of both of 
these new trends. As mentioned before, its existence was dependant upon the very 
creation of the Internet, and the global reach of that network allows it to spread itself to 
all corners of the globe in order to fulfill its goal to “organize the world’s information and 
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make it accessible” (Battelle, 2005, p. 248). An American company, Google has attained 
worldwide recognition quicker than any other brand, and it has even become an everyday 
part of the language in German (googelte), Finnish (googlata), and Japanese (guguru) 
(Vise, 2005, p. 146). It has 136 international domains offered in 116 languages, which 
draws more than 380 million users globally, and BusinessWeek ranked it twenty-fourth 
out of 100 in their Top Global Brands (Datamonitor, 2006). In 2005, it had one billion 
searches per day running through its system, most from outside the U.S. (Friedman, 
2005).  
Google has sixty-two offices, and one-fourth of its employees work abroad. In the 
fiscal year 2005, the UK made up 14.3 percent of total revenues, reaching $878.1 million, 
more than double the previous year. The “Rest of the World” category brought in 24.5 
percent of total revenues in 2005 with $1503.6 million, which was also a more than a 
twofold increase (Datamonitor, 2006). Its strong brand image has helped the company to 
release an extensive line of products such as Gmail, Blogger, the social networking site 
Orkut, and mobile services. According to CEO Eric Schmidt, “the sum of [Google’s 
addressable] market, if you include the large companies and the small companies 
throughout the world, is the world’s gross domestic product” (Battelle, 2005, p. 247-8).  
As early as 1999 Google was forging its global ties, offering web search services 
for Virgilio, a major Italian online portal, as well as teaming up with Chinese portal 
NetEase and Biglobe portal in Japan in 2000. It also decided to provide a search engine 
that used languages with characters, like Chinese and Japanese. The next year it 
introduced wireless search technology for i-mode mobile phones in Japan, and made 
agreements with Lycos Korea and Universo Online in Latin America. It also started 
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opening new sales offices around the world so that it could match the rising demand for 
its advertising programs, which is how it makes its money. In 2004 Google reached an 
agreement with AOL Europe to allow British, French and Germans to access it. By 2005 
Google had opened a product research and development center in China, persuading 
Microsoft’s Dr. Kai-Fu Lee to jump ship and lead the new China initiative, and it had 
designated three Chinese companies to be resellers for its AdWords program 
(Datamonitor, 2006). Google also bought a 2.6 percent stake in the Chinese search engine 
Baidu.com in 2004, which had referred to itself as “China’s Google.” Baidu’s stock was 
highly desired when offered to the public the next year (Vise, 2005, p. 278), although 
Google sold its stake in the company in 2006.  
Big Trouble in Big China 
Several years ago Google became determined to make its own entry into China, 
although this was proving to be both a difficult and controversial endeavor, as other 
American Internet companies had already drawn heat for capitulating to the Chinese 
government’s demand for censorship of search engines. Meanwhile, the country had 
installed a massive censorship infrastructure, commonly known as the “ Great Firewall of 
China” (Battelle, 2005, p. 204), which would filter their content coming from outside the 
country anyway. It is interesting to note that the Chinese government is actually rather 
upfront about its censorship policies and even bestows annual “Self-Discipline Awards” 
upon domestic Internet service providers. This is part of its promotion of “self-
regulation,” as it believes that “self-censorship is always far more comprehensive than 
formal censorship” (Thompson, 2006, p. 64). The other American Internet companies 
accepted this, arguing that they had to comply with the government’s wishes in order to 
62
access the enormous Chinese market and to be able to offer it their services 
(Datamonitor, 2006). 
Google originally offered its regular Google.com search engine, which, although 
operated outside the country, is accessible in China and reaches thirty-three percent of the 
110 million Chinese users (“The Internet,” 2006). However, although it held no legal 
weight against Google, which was not based in China, the government still attempted to 
block and filter content, and service was often slow and unreliable, with users even being 
redirected to local Chinese search engines. This was frustrating for users and also resulted 
in a decline of Google’s Chinese market share to below thirty percent, while its rival at 
the time, Baidu, had risen to forty-six percent (Schrage, 2006).  
In 2004, Google also offered a Chinese language version of Google News, which 
China quickly blocked completely because it used news sources deemed unacceptable to 
the government. Google rushed to negotiate with officials, and eventually the news 
service was brought back up, though without the objectionable sites. According to 
Google’s official explanation, if it left the forbidden sites in the news index, it would 
result in a “poor user experience,” because clicking on links to such sites would only 
bring up annoying error messages (Battelle, 2005, p. 206). This action by Google resulted 
in a lot of talk in the press, as well as online, of course, in popular blogs. Google spoke 
out on its own blog, utilizing the speed of digital technology in responding to a potential 
crisis. CEO Eric Schmidt declared that it would be “arrogant” to begin their business in 
China by coming in and “tell[ing] that country how to behave” (Battelle, 2005, p. 288).  
Also in 2004, Google started bringing in experts on China from all over the world 
to its headquarters to discuss the best way to enter that market while staying true to its 
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“don’t be evil” motto (Battelle, 2005). In the views of the Google founders, not having 
Google at all in China would be a “disservice” to the Chinese population, even if the 
company was not satisfied with the current censoring (Battelle, 2005, p. 209). At least, in 
their point of view, they would be going into to the Chinese market not looking to grab 
the biggest share, but looking to “do the most good” (Battelle, 2005, p. 209). As a result, 
Google created its Google.cn search engine, whose servers are based in China and thus 
subject to the government’s control. It has kept its other services, though, like Gmail and 
Blogger, hosted outside of the country. Google also estimated that fewer than two percent 
of web searches being conducted in China would have filtered search results, simply from 
the preponderance of local content that was being searched (Schrage, 2006). Although 
Google’s founders acknowledge that their Google.cn service “compromises [their] 
mission,” they also recognize that “failing to offer Google search at all to a fifth of the 
world’s population…does so far more severely” (McLaughlin, 2006, paragraph 4).  
Google’s Policy
Just as Google was singled out from the other search engines for its actions in 
China, it sought to differentiate itself on its own terms with a few key factors. First of all 
was its policy of disclosure, where it notified Chinese users whenever search results had 
been omitted, meeting users’ desire for honesty and transparency. Secondly, it was 
committed to the privacy of users, which was why it did not offer any of its services like 
Gmail and Blogger, which hold personal information, through Google.cn. Finally, it 
would still offer the original Chinese language Google.com, meaning that Google.cn was 
simply an additional service (Schrage, 2006). Google still hopes to be able to add on 
additional services if conditions in China change, and it is keeping a close eye on them 
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(Schrage, 2006). These three policies follow from some of Google’s main tenets, the first 
of which is to “satisfy the interests of users.” It also believes that “expanding access to 
information…will make our world a better, more informed, and freer place.” Thirdly, it 
sees the wisdom in “being responsive to local conditions” (Schrage, 2006, paragraph 8-
11).  
Google had already created a “consistent global policy and technical mechanism” 
for dealing with government-decreed illegal content. It has adapted its services to various 
countries; for example, it does not provide links to sites pawning Nazi paraphernalia in 
Germany or to racist sites in France, cooperating with local restrictions (“The Internet,” 
2006). It has also been in support of creating guidelines for all countries on government 
restrictions of Internet content (Schrage, 2006). Its new policy of disclosure was 
important for its relationships with its users, because it makes them aware that it is their 
own country’s legal systems that are responsible. Thus, Google can “be respectful of 
local content restrictions while providing meaningful disclosure to users and strictly 
limiting the impact to the relevant Google website for that country” (Schrage, 2006, 
paragraph 40-41), so no ill will will be harbored against it.  
Meanwhile, Google’s rivals seemed to be turning their backs on users and 
creating hostility toward themselves. In 2004, Yahoo had given a business journalist’s 
personal email user information to the Chinese government because he had used his 
account to disclose information about a government document on press restrictions to a 
pro-democracy site in New York operated by Chinese citizens. As a result, he was put 
into prison for ten years. Meanwhile, Microsoft gave in to an informal demand of the 
Chinese government in 2005 to erase the blog entries of a free-speech blogger, despite 
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the fact that Microsoft’s blogging system and all of its data were not based in China but 
in the U.S. (Thompson, 2006, p. 64). By comparison to these companies, Google seemed 
upstanding and trustworthy, although it should be noted it was not providing email or 
blog services, which was what were landing users in prison. Regardless, however, it 
would actually end up facing the most criticism, particularly from its own home country.  
Obstacles for Google
Although Yahoo and Microsoft gave in to China’s censorship long before, Google 
in particular was held in the spotlight. During Congressional hearings its executives were 
compared to “Nazi collaborators,” its stock dropped, and protesters gathered around its 
California headquarters (Thompson, 2006, p. 64). The criticism it faced was different 
from that of clothing and electronics companies whose products are made in China; for 
them, the “’brand’ suffers almost nothing” because “the bottom line rules” (Schell, as 
quoted in Battelle, 2005, p. 209). Google, on the other hand, “whose corporate persona is 
tinged with the ideology of the early part of [the IT] revolution when values like freedom, 
spontaneity, independence, and resistance to control were some of the hallmarks of the 
new movement” (Schell, as quoted in Battelle, 2005, p. 209), seemed to have started at a 
higher moral ground, and thus was held more culpable for its actions. Its “don’t be evil” 
motto certainly reinforced this. 
Criticism of Google has even been expanded to include plans by U.S. legislators 
to place restrictions on such companies doing business in China and elsewhere, even if 
these restrictions go against the foreign law (“The Internet,” 2006). Part of the proposed 
legislation would force U.S. companies to keep email servers used for Chinese traffic 
offshore, keeping the Chinese government from demanding user data (Schatz, 2006). 
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However, this would provide for a tricky precedent, for if the U.S. government is allowed 
to restrict companies’ operations in other countries due to concerns over dictatorship, it 
might theoretically be allowed to legislate for other reasons, perhaps even taking an 
opportunity to impose American values in the process. Conversely though, another 
problem would be the precedent that offering concessions to the Chinese government sets 
for companies like Google, who could theoretically negotiate censorship policies with 
any country that demanded it (Battelle, 2005). 
Battelle (2005) brings up a good point, though, which is that if the U.S. 
government wants to change China’s policies, it should not lay the task on the shoulders 
of private industry, since it is really the only power strong enough to offer leadership on 
such an issue. Furthermore, this would allow private companies to appear politically 
neutral, neither becoming entangled in conflicts with governments nor becoming their 
lapdogs. Google itself is pushing for the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce and 
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative to make censorship issues, which act as 
barriers to trade, part of trade agendas (Schrage, 2006).  
Meanwhile, criticism aside, Google has been threatened with litigation from other 
countries, which include France, Germany, Israel, and Italy, in particular over trademark 
infringement (Datamonitor, 2006). Google also still faces competition from domestic 
companies. For example, search engine company NHN held forty percent of online ad 
sales in Korea in 2005, while Google had less than two percent. In this particular case, 
home field advantage allowed it to provide more relevant search results than Google, and 
it also created the Knowledge-In program that records millions of answers to user 
questions on a wide variety of topics (Ihlwan, Woyke, & Elgin, 2006). Baidu, meanwhile, 
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Google’s main competitor in China, also created a service that lets people start and join 
instant discussion groups based on popular search terms, appealing to the Chinese 
preference for live interaction, such as chat groups (Thompson, 2006). Such “cultural 
nuances” made American search engines feel “foreign,” and pushed Chinese users toward 
their own domestic sites (Thompson, 2006, p. 64).  
Another American company on the international stage, eBay, had earlier made a 
similar misstep when it was beaten in its efforts to enter China by a Chinese site, Taobao, 
which not only was free but also was more “aesthetically Chinese” and allowed chatting 
between buyers and sellers to facilitate the important Chinese function of haggling 
(O’Leary, 2007b, p. 25). Google has since teamed up with eBay, becoming the exclusive 
supplier of Web search advertising outside the U.S., in addition to creating a joint 
development of click-to-call ads, which bring together potential buyers and sellers (Hof, 
2006, p. 8). Such collaborations between companies will also play an important role in 
the future, especially when it can all be done online, as advanced specialties will be 
brought together to offer the “next layer of value creation” (Friedman, 2005, p. 353). 
 
Thoughts for the Future 
 
In this environment of digital technology and emerging Eastern economies, what 
strategies should be employed by companies looking to expand internationally in the 
future? In the case of China, does a company make concessions to the local people and 
culture or to the government, who can control that company’s access to those people? 
And what happens when an approach to international markets results in public criticism 
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in the home market? These types of questions are likely to be faced by such companies in 
the near future, if they are not facing them already.  
 In addition, the ethical problems exist not only with the nature of the government 
of these countries, but also with what effect all these new economies industrializing and 
advancing at once will have on the environment. This has the potential to be another 
controversial issue for American corporations doing business abroad, and it will be 
difficult for them to push for restraint without seeming hypocritical. To make matters 
more complex, countries like China are also looking for fuel sources from other countries 
that have even worse reputations, such as Sudan and Iran. 
According to Zhao Jing, the blogger whose entries had been erased by Microsoft, 
Google ranks at the top of the U.S. search companies, as it was “genuinely improving the 
quality of Chinese information and trying to do its best within a bad system” (Thompson, 
2006, p. 64). Google.cn was seen as a “necessary first step” by its founders, as “the best 
way to work toward the results we all desire” (McLaughlin, 2006, paragraph 7). Whether 
or not, as some claim, Google is simply trying to tap into this extremely lucrative market, 
just like numerous other companies, its ability to spread knowledge to users 
indiscriminately is still quite a democratic push, and only time will tell if that spirit will 
take root in the country’s other institutions.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion
Hartley (2001) identifies three C’s, “complacency, conservatism, and conceit,”
which can hinder corporations, even those that are leaders in their industries (p. 349).
Business consultant Michael Hammer states that one indicator a company is “in trouble” 
is when they continually talk about “how good they were in the past” (Friedman, 2005, p. 
451). In contrast, he maintains, “the hallmark of a truly successful organization is the 
willingness to abandon what made it successful and start fresh” (Friedman, 2005, p. 451). 
This seems to have been difficult for American companies like Coca-Cola and Disney to 
do, particularly in the case of international expansion. America has largely been 
responsible for progressing the public relations field, and it holds assumptions of its own
superiority in business models. An “astute practitioner,” however, “recognizes his or her 
competence in the U.S. does not necessarily translate to competence in other countries” 
(Howard & Matthews, as quoted in Zaharna, 2000, p. 91).  
Both Coca-Cola and Disney are seen as quintessentially American corporations,
whose global expansions have even been viewed as thinly veiled attempts of
Americanization. In their respective cases, they each suffered from the perceived threat of
American culture and bigness in the form of “Coca-colonization” or “Disnification.” For
both companies, outdated or ineffective international strategies were at the heart of the
problem, involving conservative management and the belief in the easy transfer of
American practices to other countries, drawing on that “arrogance of success.” Coca
Cola’s reliance on a universal global marketing strategy, tied to former CEO Ivester, was
a major source of difficulty. Taylor (2000) notes that it may not have been brought about
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by arrogance necessarily but an “inability to accurately understand and react to the
complex cultural dynamics of the European marketplace” (p. 289). The rational
worldview held by top management became impossible to apply to the unpredictability
and diversity of global markets.
In Euro Disney’s case, its major mistake was following the “American business’s 
tendency to assume the transferability of culturally loaded business models,” particularly 
“the codification and protection of organizational procedures…[which] results in an 
approach to overseas business interactions which can easily become domineering and 
rigid” (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 476). Disney certainly held a domineering attitude
with its perceived superiority, which rubbed the proud French the wrong way. In
addition, Packman and Casmir (1999) note that Euro Disney even “attempted to function 
as separate from their environment,” which served to further the gulf between it and the 
French people (p. 480).  
Both Coca-Cola and Euro Disney’s traumatic experiences can offer lessons for
multinational companies. There is a strong need to understand that “cultural variability,
recent events, and societal tolerance of risks” can affect the way global markets respond
to a crisis and an organization’s efforts to manage it (Taylor, 2000, p. 290). In addition,
companies must clearly avoid the ethnocentrism that assumes that any strategy for their
home countries will naturally work in other regions (Taylor, 2000). Hartley (2001) 
recommends that a corporation that wishes to expand internationally must “tread 
carefully, tone down inclinations toward arrogance, and be subtle and patient in seeking 
acquisitions on foreign turf” (p. 23).  
Disney is currently looking to expand further in China, hoping to spot a park on
the mainland, preferably near Shanghai. It sees this as an opportunity to make a bold
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entry into a new market, and the Chinese government is in favor of the project, due to its
potential to increase employment and economic growth (Marr & Fowler, 2005). However
it still has such issues to face as the wide disparity in income levels. Disney is also
looking to South Korea as a possible site for a new park. Even though it believes that “the
family values it stands for are relevant in any part of the world” (Fowler & Marr, 2005),
the success of a new park is still by no means guaranteed. Interestingly enough, though, 
in a fitting collaborative effort Disney has been advertising for its Chinese TV show on 
cans of Coca-Cola (Fowler & Marr, 2005). 
As for Google, it has reached worldwide recognition in a remarkably short
timeframe, and the technological nature of its products and services has not left much of a
national stamp upon it. Not that ethnocentric arrogance is likely to be a problem for it, as
it embodies none of the three C’s that Hartley has described. Indeed, it is committed to
innovation, which should give it great flexibility as it continues to expand in new
markets.
Third Culture Building
As a final note, although globalization may be bringing about a divergence effect, 
cultures will be just as imprudent as businesses if they refuse to allow their interactions 
on the world stage to bring about a modicum of change. Although Disney stubbornly 
retained its established protocol in Europe, perhaps France too can be held accused of a 
certain degree of conservatism itself. Cultural critic John Andrews maintains, “any 
culture or nation that does not come to grips with the technologies changing our lives is, 
quite literally, living in the past” (as quoted in Lainsbury, 2000), which is a fitting 
analogue to Hartley’s 3 C’s for corporations. In addition, Norwegian media researcher 
Helge Ronning has suggested that “American popular culture is becoming everyone’s 
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second culture,” resulting in a “certain cultural bilingualism” (Gitlin, 1992, p. 1). This 
coexistence is important, as it shuns the notion that cultural exports can only result in “the 
stark binary form of a zero-sum game” (Kroes, as quoted in Lainsbury, 2000). As one 
member of the French government delegation put it, “just because an amusement park 
will open, university students are not going to stop studying Sartre” (Rudolph & Gomez, 
1991, p. 49). Disney’s sole international success, its park in Tokyo, was described by 
anthropologist Aviad Raz as partially the result of a “subtle local adaptation that lets 
Japanese people appropriate Disney’s characters and Americana for themselves” (Fowler 
& Marr, 2005, p. B1). Casmir describes this resulting process as  “third culture building,” 
which “involves mutual learning, a cooperative dialogue and building experience,” 
instead of a “one-sided” effort (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 485). This resonates with 
Friedman, who stresses the importance of glocalization, whereby a culture takes in 
“foreign ideas and best practices,” combining them with its own system of doing things 
(2005, p. 325). This process bestows an advantage on such open cultures in a globalized, 
shrinking world.  
China will certainly find itself tested by this. Its burgeoning middle class, “a class
that prides itself on being cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic” (Thompson, 2006, p.
64), will most assuredly embrace the knowledge and benefits to be derived from exposure 
to other cultures. However, if its authoritarian government stubbornly clings to its 
conservative ways, it will likely only hold China back (albeit barely). Fortunately, 
though, the cooperative and collaborative process has already begun, particularly in 
science and technology, and China’s desire to become a formidable world economic 
player offers a good chance for the scales to tip in favor of democratic progress. 
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Applied back to business again, Casmir’s third culture building model stresses the 
“importance of creating organizations that reflect the needs and values of the culture in 
which they are to function by avoiding the creation of a ‘mere replica,’ and still providing 
the unique contribution intended by its founders” (Packman & Casmir, 1999, p. 486). 
Nonetheless, Zaharna (2001) points out that “cultural assumptions are notoriously elusive 
to its own members” (p. 146). It may be hard to break out of old patterns, to see the world 
from different eyes. Successful international businesses, however, will be able to “act 
global, think [multi]local” (de Mooij, 1998, p. 299). Of course, this is more complex than 
simply adopting the policy of “When in Rome” and will require a solid understanding of 
local cultures and how they fit in the larger global context. But there is no longer any 
excuse for a business to ignore the role of culture in communication; as has been 
illustrated in this paper, even giants like Coca-Cola and Disney have been laid low for 
taking the superiority of their own way of doing things for granted. As the digital age 
continues to advance, and nascent economies join in with the rest of the world, that world 
will only shrink further. Great will be those companies that take advantage of this, who 
are flexible enough to appeal to the various markets now just a mouse click away. Even 
greater still, however, will be those companies that reflect the needs and values of these 
markets’ individual cultures, not simply existing alongside them, but finding ways to 
merge with and become a part of them.  
 
74
REFERENCES 
 
Abelson, R. (1999, June 16). In a crisis, Coke tries to be reassuring. The New York Times,
pp. 2.  
 
Andrews, E.L. (1999, June 17). Coke’s chief apologizes for response on contamination. 
 The New York Times, pp. 4. 
 
Battelle, J. (2005). The Search: How Google and its rivals rewrote the rules of business 
 and transformed our culture. New York: Portfolio. 
 
Belgian scientists question role of Coca-Cola in illnesses. (1999, June 16). Agence 
 France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Benoit, W.L. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations 
 Review, 23(2), 177-186. 
 
Brannigan, M. & Richter, K. (1999, June 11). Coke bottler in Belgium recalls product 
 after 41 children are sent to hospital. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A4. 
 
Buckley, N. & Liu, B. (1999, June 16). Coca-Cola hit as European health scare prompts 
 bans: Battle to recover consumer confidence as dozens fall ill. The Financial 
 Times, pp. 1. 
 
Certain Coca-Cola company drinks to go back on shelves. (1999, June 17). Agence 
 France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Chang, S. (2007). The top 10 challenges and myths for doing business in China. 
 http://webershandwick.com/capabilities/cap/index.cfm/ 
cap,4,contentid,13831,display,tl.html 
 
Coca-Cola Belgium identifies cause of contamination of soft drinks. (1999, June 15). 
 Agence France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis 
 Academic. 
 
Coca-Cola chairman “deeply regrets” problems caused to Europeans. (1999, June 16). 
 Agence France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis 
 Academic. 
 
Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc.: Bottles recalled in France due to defect in packaging. (2001, 
 March 8). The Wall Street Journal, pp. C9. 
 
Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc.: Recall of some of Coke Classic was completed last fall. 
 (2001, February 21). The Wall Street Journal, pp. B2. 
 
75
Coca-Cola gives test results to Belgian government. (1999, June 21). Agence France 
 Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Coca-Cola health scare still shrouded in mystery. (1999, June 16). De Financieel-
 Economische Tijd. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from World News Connection. 
 
Coca-Cola health scare widens in Europe. (1999, June 18). Reuters News. Retrieved 
 November 28, 2006 from Factiva. 
 
Coca-Cola ordered to stop promotional campaign in Belgium. (1999, November 30). 
 Agence France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis 
 Academic. 
 
Coca-Cola pulled off shelves in Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands. (1999, June 15). 
 Agence France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis 
 Academic. 
 
Coca-Cola reassures French consumers as bans on cans upheld. (1999, June 21). Agence 
 France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Coca-Cola recalls bottles of drink sold in Belgium. (2001, May 29). The Wall Street 
 Journal, pp. B11. 
 
Coca-Cola sees sales fall, finds mold dead in drink. (1999, June 30). Agence France 
 Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Coca-Cola urged to heed consumers to salvage image. (1999, June 18). Reuters News.
Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Factiva. 
 
Cohen, R. (1992a, April 10). Threat of strike in Euro Disney debut. The New York Times,
pp. D20. 
 
Cohen, R. (1992b, June 8). Slow Start at Europe’s Disneyland. The New York Times, pp. 
 D1. 
 
Cohen, R. (1993, July 18). When you wish upon a deficit. The New York Times, pp. 1. 
 
Coke faces struggle in European recovery, Goldman report says. (1999, July 28). The 
 Wall Street Journal, pp. B15. 
 
Coke will foot medical bills if link with illnesses proved. (1999, June 17). Agence  France 
 Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Cowell, A. (1999, June 29). Coke scare was preceded by a May case. The New York 
 Times, pp. C1. 
 
76
Crumley, B. & Fisher, C. (1994). Euro Disney tries to end evil spell. Advertising Age,
65(6), 39. 
 
Curwen, P. (1995). EuroDisney: the mouse that roared (not!). European Business Review, 
 95(5),  15-20. 
 
Datamonitor. (2006, October). Google Inc.: Company Profile. Retrieved March 18, 2006 
 from Business Source Complete. 
 
De Mooij, M. (1998). Global marketing and advertising: Understanding cultural 
 paradoxes. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
Dejevsky, M. (1996, October 30). Mickey finds a place in French life. The Independent,
pp. 9. 
 
Deogun, N. & Richter, K. (1999a, June 15). Belgium bans most Coca-Cola products after 
 complaints of over 100 illnesses. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B15.  
 
Deogun, N. & Richter, K. (1999b, June 16). Coca-Cola pinpoints set of problems in 
 production, distribution in Belgium. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A4. 
 
Deogun, N., Hagerty, J.R., Stecklow, S. & Johannes, L. (1999, June 29). Cola 
 stains—anatomy of a recall: How Coke’s controls fizzled out in Europe. The Wall 
 Street Journal, pp. A1. 
 
Diamond, H. (2007). The globalization of PR: Myth or reality. 
 http://webershandwick.com/newsroom/thoughtleadership.cfm/   
contentid,13886.html 
 
Echikson, W. & Rocks, D. (1999). The name Coke now scares people. BusinessWeek,
3636, 32. 
 
Eisner, M. (1998). Work in progress. New York: Random House. 
 
Euro Disney net profit sharply higher in year to September. (1997, November 13). 
 Agence France Presse. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Euro Disney posts loss in 1992, sees no improvement next year. (1992, November 19). 
 Agence France Presse. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Euro Disney profit soars 34 percent. (1998, November 18). Agence France Presse. 
Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Euro Disney profits slump on resumption of royalty payments. (1999, November 2). 
 Agence France Presse. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
77
Euro Disney registers 350 million dollar loss. (1994, November 3). Agence France 
 Presse. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Euro Disney reports less visitors, bigger losses at theme park. (2003, November 17). 
 Agence France Presse. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Euro Disney reports profit for ’95, but the future remains cloudy. (1995, November 16). 
 The New York Times, pp. D7. 
 
Euro Disney’s performance “dreadful,” says Walt Disney Chairman. (1993, December 
 29). Agence France Presse. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis 
 Academic. 
 
Euro Disney’s shares surge 16.0 percent on launch of capital increase. (2005, January 
 31). Agence France Presse. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis 
 Academic. 
 
Fawcett, K. (1992). The (PR) mouse that roared in six languages. Communication World, 
 9(12), 13-16. 
 
Fifty million cans of Coca-Cola drinks withdrawn in France. (1999, June 16). Agence 
 France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Fleming, C. (1999, September 30). Euro Disney to build movie theme park outside Paris. 
 The New York Times, pp. A18. 
 
Fondiller, D. (1997, November 3). Mickey’s last laugh. Forbes, pp. 16C. 
 
Forman, J. (1998). Corporate image and the establishment of Euro Disney: Mickey 
 Mouse and the French press. Technical Communication Quarterly, 7(3), 247-258. 
 
Fowler, G.A. (2006, September 5). Hong Kong Disney misses target. The Wall Street 
 Journal, pp. D2. 
 
Fowler, G.A. & Marr, M. (2005, June 16). Disney’s China play—its new Hong Kong 
 park is a big cultural experiment. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1. 
 
Freedman, R.D. & Butterfield, C. (2000). Coke loses some fizz. Retrieved November 27, 
 2006  from http://www.stern.nyu.edu/mgt/private_file/mo/rfreedma_ca/coca.pdf  
 
French coach operators threaten Euro Disney boycott. (1992, May 4). Agence France 
 Press. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
French far right targets Disneyland. (1992, January 16). Agence France Presse. Retrieved 
 February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
78
Friedman, T.L. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. New 
 York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
 
Garrahan, M. (2005, April 29). Euro Disney hopes to ride out bad times. Financial Times,
pp. 30. 
 
Garrahan, M. & Hearn, L. (2002, November 14). Park launch hits Euro Disney. Financial 
 Times, pp. 30. 
 
Gibson, D.C. (1995). Public relations considerations of consumer product recall. Public 
 Relations Review, 21(3), 225-240. 
 
Gitlin, T. (1992, May 3). World leaders: Mickey, et al. The New York Times, pp. 1. 
 
Godwin, N. (1994) Disneyland Paris is new address in France for Mickey and Minnie. 
 Travel  Weekly, 53(84), 1-3. 
 
Grant, R.M. (2003). Euro Disney: From dream to nightmare, 1987-94. In R.M. Grant & 
 K.E. Neupert (eds.) Cases in contemporary strategy analysis (pp. 256-284). 
 Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.  
 
Greenhouse, S. (1991, February 17). Playing Disney in the Parisian fields. The New York 
 Times, pp. 1. 
 
Gumbel, P. (1994, February 22). Euro Disney calls on Mary Poppins to tidy up mess at 
 French resort. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A14. 
 
Gumbel, P. & Turner, R. (1994, March 10). Mouse trap: Fans like Euro Disney but its 
 parent’s goofs weigh the park down. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A1. 
 
Hagerty, J.R. & Barrett, A. (1999a, June 18). Management: Can Douglas Ivester end 
 Coke’s crisis? The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1. 
 
Hagerty, J.R. & Barrett, A. (1999b, June 24). Coke wins clearance to resume Belgian 
 sales. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A2. 
 
Hagerty, J.R. & Deogun, N. (1999a, June 17). Management: Coke scrambles to contain a 
 scare in Europe. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1. 
 
Hagerty, J.R. & Deogun, N. (1999b, June 22). Coke’s Ivester apologizes to Belgians. The 
 Wall Street Journal, pp. A3. 
 
Hagerty, J.R. & Deogun, N. (1999c, June 25). France lets Coke resume production at 
 plant. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A4. 
 
79
Handyside, G. (1999, June 27). Coca-Cola mishandled health scare says executive. 
 Reuters News. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Factiva. 
 
Hartley, R.F. (2001). Marketing mistakes and successes. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
 Inc. 
 
Hays, C. L. (1999a, June 22). Coca-Cola chairman uses ads to apologize to Belgians. The 
 New York Times, pp. 4. 
 
Hays, C.L. (1999b, July 16). Coca-Cola earnings fall 21%, reflecting troubles in Europe. 
 The New York Times, pp. 2. 
 
Herbig, P. A. (1998). Handbook of cross-cultural marketing. New York: The 
 International Business Press. 
 
Hof, R. (2006, August 29). Google and eBay’s new connection. Business Week Online, 8. 
 Retrieved March 3, 2007 from Business Source Complete.  
 
Huey, J. (1995). Eisner explains everything. Fortune, 131(7), 44-48. 
 
Ihlwan, M., Woyke, E., & Elgin, B. (2006). The little search engine that could. Business 
 Week, 3969, 44. 
 
Johnson, V. & Peppas, S.C. (2003). Crisis management in Belgium: The case of Coca-
 Cola. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 8(1), 18-22. 
 
Kielmas, M. (1999). Interest in recall cover rises. Business Insurance, 33(33), 31-32. 
 
Lainsbury, A. (2000). Once upon an American dream: The story of Euro Disneyland.
Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press. 
 
Landler, M. (1999, November 3). Mickey and Minnie go to Hong Kong. The New York 
 Times, pp. C1.  
 
Lawson, M. (1993, August 24). Taking the mickey out of Euro Disney. The Independent,
pp. 20. 
 
Lee, S. (2005). The emergence of global public and international public relations. Public 
 Relations Quarterly, 50(2), 14-16. 
 
Marr, M. & Fowler, G.A. (2005, June 16). Why intrepid mouse looks to Asia for growth. 
 The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1. 
 
Marsh, H. (1996, May 2). Variations on a theme park. Marketing, pp. 14. 
 
80
McKay, B. & Deogun, N. (1999, December 17). After short, stormy tenure, Coke’s 
 Ivester to retire. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1. 
 
McLaughlin, A. (2006, January 27). Google in China. 
 http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/01/google-in-china.html 
 
Muir Packman, H. & Casmir, F.L. (1999). Learning from the Euro Disney experience. 
 Gazette, 61(6), 473-489. 
 
Nash, N.C. (1995, July 26). Euro Disney reports its first profits. The New York Times, pp. 
 D3. 
 
New twist in French Coca-Cola scare as judicial inquiry opened. (1999, June 23). Agence 
 France Press. Retrieved November 28, 2006 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
O’Leary, N. (2007a). The new superpower: China’s emerging middle class. Adweek, 
 48(1), 12-18. 
 
O’Leary, N. (2007b). Bright lights, big challenge. Adweek, 48(3), 22-33. 
 
O’Leary, N. (2007c). The lay of the land. Adweek, 48(6), 14-21. 
 
Phillips, A. (1993). Where’s the magic? Maclean’s, 106(18), 47. 
 
Prada, P. (2000, November 17). Euro Disney’s net income climbs 64%. The Wall Street 
 Journal, pp. A17. 
 
Prada, P. & Orwall, B. (2002, March 12). A certain “je ne sais quoi” at Disney’s new 
 park. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1. 
 
Rees, J. (1992). The mouse that ate France. National Review, 44(9), 57-59. 
 
Riding, A. (1992, April 13). Only the French elite scorn Mickey’s debut. The New York 
 Times, pp. A1. 
 
Rudolph, B. & Gomez, E.M. (1991). Monsieur Mickey. Time, 137(12), 48-49. 
 
Schatz, A. (2006). Internet censorship: Firms face grilling on China. The Wall Street 
 Journal, pp. A2. 
 
Schrage, E. (2006, February 15). Testimony: The Internet in China. 
 http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-china.html 
 
Sellers, P. (1999). Crunch time for Coke. Fortune, 140(2), 72-78. 
 
81
Slater, J. & Wentz, L. (1999). Coke taps Publicis to stanch crisis. Advertising Age,
70(26), 50. 
 
Smith, H., Feighan, A., & O’Rourke, J.S. (2002). Coca-Cola and the European 
 contamination  crisis. In J.S. O’Rourke (Ed.), The business communication 
 casebook: A Notre Dame collection (pp. 293-301). Canada: South-Western 
 Thomson Learning. 
 
Smith, N.C., Thomas, R.J., & Quelch, J.A. (1996). A strategic approach to managing 
 product recalls. Harvard Business Review, 74(5), 102-112. 
 
Solomon, J. & Stanger, T. (1994). Mickey’s trip to trouble. Newsweek, 123(7), 34-38. 
 
Sparks-Fitzgerald, S. & Spagnolia, N. (1999). Four predictions for PR practitioners in the 
 new millennium. Public Relations Quarterly, 44(3), 12. 
 
Spencer, E.P. (1995). Euro Disney--What happened? What next? Journal of International 
 Marketing, 3(3), 1995, 103-114. 
 
Tagliabue, J. (1995, August 23). Step right up, monsieur! The New York Times, pp. D1. 
 
Taylor, M. (2000). Cultural variance as a challenge to global public relations: A case 
 study of the Coca-Cola scare in Europe. Public Relations Review, 26(3), 277-293. 
 
Tempest, R. (1992, June 27). French farmers block Europe’s Disneyland; Park draws ire 
 of those angry at America. The Washington Post, pp. A14. 
 
The Internet: East meets West. (2006). New Jersey Lawyer, 15(11), 6. 
 
Thompson, C. (2006, April 23). Google’s China problem (and China’s Google problem). 
 The New York Times, pp 64. 
 
Tokyo Disneyland has no crisis of conscience, only makes money. (1992, April 10). 
 Agence France Press. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
Tomkins, R. (1999a, June 17). A spillage of goodwill: Richard Tomkins examines the 
 flaws in Coca-Cola’s approach to product contamination, and the lessons it might 
 have learned from history. The Financial Times, pp. 25. 
 
Tomkins, R. (1999b, June 19). Coca-Cola names sulphur as a contaminant. The Financial 
 Times, pp. 3.  
 
Turner, R. (1992, May 27). Euro Disney’s Fitzpatrick denies report that 3,000 workers 
 quit over low pay. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B10. 
 
82
Turner, R. & Coleman, B. (1994, June 2). Saudi to buy as much as 24% of Euro Disney. 
 The Wall Street Journal, pp. A3. 
 
Turner, R. & Gumbal, P. (1992, April 10). Major attraction: As Euro Disney braces for 
 its grand opening, the French go Goofy. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A1. 
 
Unger, H. (2000, April 1). Illnesses in Coke recall found psychosomatic. The Atlanta 
 Journal and Constitution, pp. 1F. 
 
Vise, D.A. (2005). The Google story. New York: Delacorte.  
 
Wakefield, R.I. (2000). World-class public relations: A model for effective public 
 relations in the multinational. Journal of Communication Management, 5(1), 59-
 71. 
 
Whelan, E.M. (1999, June 21). Coca-Cola: Euro-scare isn’t the ‘real thing.’ The Wall 
 Street Journal, pp. A26.  
 
Wrighton, J. & Orwall, B. (2005, January 26). Mutual attraction: Despite losses and 
 bailouts, France stays devoted to Disney. The Wall Street Journal, pp. A1. 
 
Zaharna, R.S. (2000). Intercultural Communication and International Public Relations: 
 Exploring Paralells. Communication Quarterly, 48(1), 85-100. 
 
Zaharna, R.S. (2001). “In-awareness” approach to international public relations. Public 
 Relations Review, 27, 135-148. 
 
